1

目的

1.1

該政策的目的是規定基礎，強制從Moolec Science SA（以下簡稱爲「本公司」及其子公司）的執行官（以下定義）那裏追回因錯誤授予的激勵性薪酬（如下定義）的依據，以求得再確認（如下定義）後。納斯達克 Clawback 政策”)是爲了規定從Bioceres Crop Solutions Corp.（以下簡稱「本公司」）的高管（以下簡稱「高管」）收回錯誤發放的激勵性報酬（如下所定義）的基礎公司”, 連同其子公司一起，本公司集團在進行重述（如下所定義）時。

1.2

公司董事會已根據納斯達克證券交易所要求採納了這項追索政策董事會公司已根據納斯達克證券交易所要求，採納了這項納斯達克追索政策（"納斯達克資本市場）上市規則5608，並依據1934年證券交易所法案第10D-1條規定的規定製定了此規則。使擁有公司註冊證券類別10%以上股權的官員、董事或實際股東代表簽署人遞交表格3、4和5（包括修正版及有關聯合遞交協議）,符合證券交易法案第16(a)條及其下屬規則規定的要求；”).

1.3

納斯達克追索政策可能會根據董事會薪酬委員會不時修訂薪酬委員會”根據美國證券交易委員會、納斯達克、公司證券上市的任何其他交易所或適用於集團或高管的其他監管機構的任何法律、法規或規則。適用法律包括2002年美國薩班斯-豪利法案第304條。執行管理人員將被告知對納斯達克追索政策的任何重大修訂以及這些修訂可能如何影響他們的報酬。適用法律納斯達克追索政策適用於任何現任和前任高管，如公司可能根據納斯達克交易規則5608(d)中「高管」一詞的定義不時判斷

2

適用性

2.1

這項納斯達克追索政策適用於任何現任和前任高管，如公司可能根據納斯達克交易規則5608(d)中「高管」一詞的定義不時判斷高管”). 公司的母公司或子公司的高管如果爲公司執行此類制定政策的功能，則視爲公司的高管。個人在被判斷爲高管後將盡快收到通知。

2.2

酬金將根據納斯達克Clawback政策進行追回，在以下情況下適用：(i) 補償委員會判斷該酬金構成獎勵基礎性補償; 和 (ii) 該酬金爲高管所接收（如下定義）：

2.3

爲了避免疑問，納斯達克追索政策將繼續適用於高管在離任後。

2.4

這一納斯達克追索政策將通過補償委員會判斷的任何方式通知給高管。

3

糾正錯誤授予的激勵報酬

3.1

如果公司因未遵從證券法項下的任何財務報告要求（紐交所上市公司手冊第303A.14節中使用的）而被要求進行會計重述（即“重述”，包括任何必需的會計重述以糾正先前發佈的財務報表中的錯誤，該錯誤對先前發佈的財務報表具有重大影響，或者如果該錯誤在當前期間得以糾正或在當前期間未得以糾正將導致重大錯誤，董事薪酬委員會應合理迅速追索執行計劃基礎薪酬中在恢復期內超過本應根據重述金額確定的執行計劃基礎薪酬金額的部分。計算時不考慮任何稅/稅費/稅收/徵費款項（“稅收”）支付或應支付的情況可回收金額可恢復金額不得超過與該執行人因重報而支付的激勵性報酬之間的差額，以及如果沒有發生重報時將支付給該執行人的激勵性報酬之間的差額（在每種情況下均不考慮已支付或應支付的任何稅款）。如果激勵性報酬僅部分基於財務報告指標績效目標，薪酬委員會應首先判斷重報前原始激勵性報酬中基於或來源於已重報的財務報告指標的部分。然後，薪酬委員會將重新計算受影響的部分，根據已重報的財務報告指標，收回原始財務報表所基於的更高金額與根據重報所應收到的較低金額之間的差額。在計算可恢復金額時，薪酬委員會可以全權自行決定，與法律顧問和任何專家協商，以協助進行此類計算。

3.2

爲了本納斯達克追回政策的目的，是否發生了重報將由薪酬委員會確認，薪酬委員會將依賴審計委員會在這方面做出的任何決定。

3.3

恢復期指公司重報日期（如下定義）前的三個完整財政年度期間和由於公司財政年度在該期間內或緊隨其後變更而導致的任何過渡期。²

3.4

對於基於股價或總股東回報的激勵性報酬，如果可恢復金額不能直接從重報信息中進行數學重新計算，則可恢復金額將由薪酬委員會基於薪酬委員會對重報對股價或總股東回報的影響的合理估計而確定。

²

說明：公司上一個財政年度結束日和下一個財政年度開始日之間的過渡期將被視爲一個完整的財政年度，因此將算作相關的三個財政年度之一（而非額外計算）。

3.5

如果公司需要準備重編的話，薪酬委員會應：

3.5.1

按照納斯達克收回政策第3.1條的規定確定可回收金額；並

3.5.2

在執行董事已經收到可回收金額的範圍內，指示公司依照納斯達克收回政策第3.6條的規定盡快收回完整的可回收金額；或

3.5.3

在可回收金額尚未被執行董事收到，但是其他款項應該支付給執行董事的範圍內，取消該執行董事收取可回收金額的權利，盡快取消。

3.6

在適用法律允許的範圍內，薪酬委員會可以通過所有合法手段尋求收回可回收金額，包括但不限於，要求任何受影響的執行董事將該金額償還給公司，通過抵銷，通過減少該受影響執行董事的未來報酬，或根據薪酬委員會據其獨立和絕對裁量判斷認為適當的其他手段或手段的組合。

3.7

根據薪酬委員會書面決議，公司將盡快在納斯達克收回政策下啟動可回收金額的收回。

3.8

所有板塊根據這項納斯達克追討政策應由執行長支付給公司（或由公司指示），並應在要求立即支付。

3.9

就此納斯達克追討政策而言：

3.9.1

“激勵報酬” 意味著任何基於完全或部分取得財務報告指標（如下定義）而授予、獲得或取得/釋放的報酬。如果激勵性報酬在一定程度上取決於取得財務報告指標，則此類報酬受到多個條件的約束，其中之一或多個條件是財務報告指標。激勵性報酬的示例包括但不限於：（i）基於滿足財務報告指標績效目標而完全或部分獲得的非股權激勵計劃獎勵；（ii）從“獎金池”支付的獎金，其大小完全或部分根據滿足財務報告指標績效目標而確定；（iii）完全或部分根據滿足財務報告指標績效目標而獲得的其他現金獎勵；（iv）根據滿足財務報告指標績效目標而授予或變現/釋放的限制性股份、限制性股份單位、績效股份單位、股票期權和股票增值權；以及（v）通過激勵計劃取得的股份出售所獲取的收益，這些股份或部分取得贈予或變現/釋放基於滿足財務報告指標績效目標。

(i)

激勵性報酬包括根據集團不時運作的完全或部分基於財務報告指標的變量報酬結構而授予的、發生的或取得的任何報酬。

(ii)

Examples of compensation that is not Incentive-Based Compensation for this purpose include, but are not limited to: (i) an Executive’s salary;³ (ii) bonuses paid solely at the discretion of the Compensation Committee or the Board that are not paid from a “bonus pool” that is determined by satisfying a Financial Reporting Measure performance goal; (iii) bonuses paid solely upon satisfying one or more subjective standards (e.g. demonstrated leadership) and/or completion of a specified employment period); (iv) non-equity incentive plan awards earned solely upon satisfying one or more strategic measures (e.g., consummating a merger or divestiture), or operational measures (e.g., completion of a project, increase in market share); and (v) equity awards for which the grant is not contingent upon achieving any Financial Reporting Measure performance goal and vesting/release is contingent solely upon completion of a specified employment period and/or attaining one or more nonfinancial reporting measures.

3.9.2

“Financial Reporting Measure” means any measure that is determined and presented in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IFRS”) (or any other accounting principles used to prepare the Group’s financial statements from time to time), and any measure derived wholly or in part from such measure, including non-IFRS financial measures (as well as other measures, metrics and ratios that are non-IFRS measures). The term Financial Reporting Measure includes stock price and total shareholder return. Financial Reporting Measures may be presented outside the Company’s financial statements.

3.9.3

“Received”: Incentive-Based Compensation is deemed Received in the Company’s financial period during which the Financial Reporting Measure specified in the Incentive-Based Compensation award is attained, even if the payment or grant occurs after the end of the financial period in which the Financial Reporting Measure is attained. For the avoidance of doubt, an Executive receives the Incentive-Based Compensation even when the Executive has established only a contingent right to payment at that time. Ministerial acts or other conditions necessary to effect issuance or payment, such as calculating the amount earned or obtaining Compensation Committee approval of payment do not affect the determination of the date Received. In the case of awards subject to multiple conditions, not all conditions must be satisfied for the Incentive-Based Compensation to be deemed Received. The Compensation Committee shall have the discretion to determine when the Incentive-Based Compensation was Received, and such determination need not be uniform across the type of Incentive-Based Compensation or for all Executives.

3.9.4

“Restatement Date” means the date on which the Company is required to prepare a Restatement, which is the earlier to occur of: (i) the date on which the Board, or the Audit Committee concludes, or reasonably should have concluded, that the Company is required to prepare a Restatement; or (ii) the date a court, regulator or other legal authorised body directs the Company to prepare a Restatement.

4

IMPRACTICABILITY EXCEPTION TO RECOVERY OBLIGATION

4.1

The Company must recover the Recoverable Amount in compliance with this Nasdaq Clawback Policy except to the extent that the conditions set out in 4.2.1, 4.2.2 or 4.2.3 of this Nasdaq

³

Explanatory Note: To the extent that an Executive receives a salary increase earned wholly or in part based on the attainment of a Financial Reporting Measure performance goal, such a salary increase is subject to recovery.

4.2

The Compensation Committee may determine that a recovery is impracticable only if:

4.2.1

following a reasonable attempt to recover the Recoverable Amount, the Compensation Committee determines, in its sole discretion, that the direct expense that would need to be paid to a third party to assist in enforcing this Nasdaq Clawback Policy would exceed the Recoverable Amount. The Company must document such reasonable attempt(s) to recover and provide that documentation to Nasdaq;

4.2.2

recovery would violate a law of the Cayman Islands, where such law was adopted prior to November 28, 2022. Before concluding that it would be impracticable to recover any Recoverable Amount based on a violation of the law of the Cayman Islands, the Company must obtain an opinion of a law firm in the Cayman Islands, acceptable to Nasdaq that recovery would result in such a violation and provide such opinion to Nasdaq; or

4.2.3

if applicable, the Compensation Committee determines that recovery would likely cause an otherwise tax-qualified retirement plan, under which benefits are broadly available to employees of the Company, to fail to meet the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 401(a)(13) or 26 U.S.C. 411(a) and regulations thereunder.

4.3

In determining whether a recovery would be impracticable due to costs in accordance with 4.2.1 above, the only criteria that the Compensation Committee may consider is whether the direct costs, such as reasonable legal expense and consulting fees, amongst others, paid to a third party to assist in enforcing recovery would exceed the Recoverable Amount. Indirect costs, such as reputational concerns or the effect on hiring of new Executives, amongst others, may not be considered when determining whether recovery is impracticable.

5

INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE

5.1

The Group is prohibited from insuring or indemnifying any Executive against the loss of erroneously awarded remuneration as set forth in this Nasdaq Clawback Policy. If an Executive purchases a third-party insurance policy to fund potential recovery obligations, the Company is prohibited from paying or reimbursing the Executive for premiums for such an insurance policy.

6

OTHER RECOVERY RIGHTS

6.1

Any right of recovery under this Nasdaq Clawback Policy applies in addition to (and without limiting) any other remedies and/or rights to reduce, cancel or recover any elements of remuneration (or similar) that may be available to any member of the Group pursuant to any remuneration policy (including any further malus and clawback policies) operated by any member of the Group, the terms of any incentive plans or awards operated by any member of the Group, any employment agreement, any other terms and conditions and/or Applicable Law applicable to any Executive, in each case from time to time in force, and/or pursuant to any other legal remedies available to any member of the Group. Recovery (or similar) may be applied pursuant to both this Nasdaq Clawback Policy and any such other policies, plans, awards, agreements, terms, conditions, Applicable Laws or similar in respect of the same award of remuneration, provided that there shall be no duplication of recovery.

7

DISCLOSURE

7.1

In the event of any Restatement, the Company shall disclose certain information in its annual report on Form 20-F, as required by Form 20-F This information shall include, without limitation:

7.1.1

the date on which the Company was required to prepare the Restatement;

7.1.2

the aggregate Recoverable Amount (in US dollars), including an analysis of how the Recoverable Amount was calculated, or, if not determined, an explanation of the reasons;

7.1.3

any estimates used to determine the Recoverable Amount for Financial Reporting Measures related to share price or total shareholder return and an explanation of the methodology used for such estimates;

7.1.4

any required details of Recoverable Amounts that remain outstanding (on an aggregate, individual, group or other basis, as required) and for which recovery has been forgone due to impracticability and the reasons why, for the relevant annual report on Form 20-F and otherwise pursuant to the requirements of any other annual report or statement it is obligated to prepare and file under the Exchange Act.

7.2

This Nasdaq Clawback Policy shall be filed as an exhibit to the first annual report on Form 20-F that the Company is required to file under the Exchange Act after the adoption of this Nasdaq Clawback Policy. If this Nasdaq Clawback Policy is amended, the amended policy shall be filed as an exhibit to the first annual report on Form 20-F that the Company is required to file under the Exchange Act after such amendment.

8

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION

8.1

The Compensation Committee has the exclusive power and full and final authority to: (i) administer this Nasdaq Clawback Policy, including, without limitation, the right and power to interpret the provisions of this Nasdaq Clawback Policy; (ii) make all determinations deemed necessary or advisable in applying this Nasdaq Clawback Policy (which in every case shall be made at the Compensation Committee’s absolute discretion, without this being limited by references in certain clauses but not others to a discretion being absolute), including, without limitation, determinations as to: (a) what constitutes Incentive-Based Compensation, a Recoverable Amount or other remuneration; (b) that a Restatement has occurred (in reliance on any decision in this respect of the Audit Committee); and (c) whether a recovery is impracticable; and (iii) delegate any power or discretion under this Nasdaq Clawback Policy to such person or persons as it may determine (and in which case this Nasdaq Clawback Policy shall be applied accordingly). The Compensation Committee may delegate ministerial administrative duties with respect to this Nasdaq Clawback Policy to one or more officers or employees of the Company.

8.2

Any action, interpretation or determination taken or made by the Compensation Committee pursuant to this Nasdaq Clawback Policy will be final, conclusive and binding.

8.3

From and after the adoption of this Nasdaq Clawback Policy, each award agreement or other document setting forth the terms and conditions of any annual incentive or other performance-based award granted to an Executive shall include a provision incorporating the requirements of this Nasdaq Clawback Policy.

9

GENERAL

9.1

Any provision in this Nasdaq Clawback Policy can apply even if the Executive was not responsible for the Restatement in question or if it took place before the grant and/or vesting/release of any remuneration which is subject to recovery.

9.2

The means of recovery can be different for different Executives in relation to the same or different events depending on the particular facts and circumstances of the Executive and their compensation.

9.3

An Executive will not be entitled to any remuneration or compensation from the Group in respect of any application of this Nasdaq Clawback Policy.

9.4

The remedy specified in this Nasdaq Clawback Policy shall not be exclusive and shall be in addition to every other right or remedy at law or in equity that may be available to the Company or a member of the Group.

9.5

The terms of this Nasdaq Clawback Policy shall apply regardless of any agreement, undertaking or suggestion (or similar), whether or not contractual, that any remuneration shall not be subject to recovery.

9.6

The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of this Nasdaq Clawback Policy shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision.

9.7

New York law governs this Nasdaq Clawback Policy and its construction. The New York City courts have non-exclusive jurisdiction in respect of disputes arising under or in connection with this Nasdaq Clawback Policy.

9.8

References in this Nasdaq Clawback Policy to the phrase “including” (or similar) shall not limit or prejudice the generality of the following words (without this being limited by such references in some clauses but not others).