牛牛敲黑板：
考慮到搭建投資體系的要求以及投資者的需求，我們準備創立一個新系列——知名投資者談估值。畢竟如何對企業估值對於大多數投資者，都充滿挑戰性。因而，通過向知名投資者/投資大師學習，也可以幫助我們瞭解他們是怎麼對企業進行估值，或者如何看待估值。
首篇會分享巴菲特對估值的觀點，後續還會分享唐朝、水晶蒼蠅拍、思想鋼印、馮柳、吳伯庸、達摩達蘭等我曾經或者當前學習的對象的估值體系。
本篇，彙總了十個問答來總結巴菲特的估值體系，重點部分內容，我已經加粗。
問1：如何看待價值？
Q1: How do you think about value?
答1：價值公式是由公元前600年一個叫做伊索的人傳承下來的：一鳥在手等於二鳥在林。投資就是在當前向樹叢中放出一隻鳥,期望將來能夠從那裏收回兩隻或兩隻以上的鳥。這裏面的關鍵問題僅僅包括：1）研究你看上的樹叢；2）確定你將來可以捕到多少鳥及捕到這些鳥所需要的時間。如果存款利率是20%的話，趕緊捕鳥（言外之意，可以存銀行了）。要是存款利率只有1%呢，那就等個十年吧。要仔細考慮資產可以帶來的收益。一定要專注資產而不是beta值，我個人並不在意股價的波動，所以對我來説，股票價格不重要，也許它的意義僅在於為你提供可以以便宜的價格買入股票的機會。我不會在意紐約證券交易所關上5年門。與各類事件相比，我更關心生意。我在意產品的定價權以及公司能否獲得更多的市場份額。我還在意人們是否消費更多的可樂。
A1：The formula for value was handed down from 600 BC by a guy named Aesop. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Investing is about laying out a bird now to get two or more out of the bush. The keys are to only look at the bushes you like and identify how long it will take to get them out. When interest rates are 20%, you need to get it out right now. When rates are 1%, you have 10 years. Think about what the asset will produce. Look at the asset, not the beta. I don’t really care about volatility. Stock price is not that important to me, it just gives you the opportunity to buy at a great price. I don’t care if they close the NYSE for 5 years. I care more about the business than I do about events. I care about if there’s price flexibility and whether the company can gain more market share. I care about people drinking more Coke.
20年前，我從聯邦儲蓄保險公司（FDIC）手裏以600美元/公頃的價格買了一個農場。時至今日，我對經營農場還一竅不通，但是我的兒子是把好手。我曾經問過他買玉米（種子）、耕地、收割的成本是多少，每公頃產量是多少，以及糧食的價格如何。但是，二十年間我從來不知道那個農場的市面價格是多少。
I bought a farm from the FDIC 20 years ago for $600 per acre. Now I don’t know anything about farming but my son does. I asked him, how much it cost to buy corn, plow the field, harvest, how much an acre will yield, what price to expect. I haven’t gotten a quote on that farm in 20 years.
要是我開商學院的話，我只教授兩門課。第一門毫無疑問就是投資課程，講講如何給企業估值。第二門就是講一下該如何看待股票市場以及如何應對股票價格波動。股票市場很有意思。你自己可能沒有任何要買賣的意思，卻有一大羣傻瓜在不停地提供不同的價格，這就使你（在交易中）佔據了非常大的優勢。我希望市場能像一個時而狂躁時而抑鬱的醉漢。
If I were running a business school I would only have 2 courses. The first would obviously be an investing class about how to value a business. The second would be how to think about the stock market and how to deal with the volatility. The stock market is funny. You have no compulsion to act and a bunch of silly people setting prices all the time, it is great odds. I want the market to be like a manic depressive drunk.
問2：怎麼計算內在價值？
Q2: How do you calculate intrinsic value?
答2：內在價值是特別重要但又極具彈性的概念。我們儘量去買那些我們能夠大概率預見未來的公司。如果你擁有一條輸氣管線，出錯的概率就要小很多。也許競爭者的介入會迫使你降低對輸氣管線的估價，但是如果你已經考慮了（競爭者介入會導致資產價格降低）這個因素，你得出的內在價值就不會因為競爭者的介入而降低。最近，我們在考察一條輸氣管線，我們考慮了以其它方式向該管線供氣區域輸氣可能會對該管線內在價值的影響。對於另外一條輸氣管線——該管線的成本非常低，我們的看法就不一樣了（因為它不會面臨來自另一條競爭管線的威脅）。如果你要合理地計算內在價值，你必須考慮一些因素，如估價不斷降低等因素。
A2：Intrinsic value is terribly important but very fuzzy. We try to work with businesses where we have fairly high probability of knowing what the future will hold. If you own a gas pipeline, not much is going to go wrong. Maybe a competitor enters forcing you to cut prices, but intrinsic value hasn't gone down if you already factored this in. We looked at a pipeline recently that we think will come under pressure from other ways of delivering gas [to the area the pipeline serves]. We look at this differently from another pipeline that has the lowest costs [and does not face threats from alternative pipelines]. If you calculate intrinsic value properly, you factor in things like declining prices.
當我們買入一樁生意時，我們儘量估算該生意未來可以產生的現金流，並將其與買入價格進行比較。我們必須對自己的預測有相當的信心，並由此得出一個合理的買入價格。長期以來，我們收穫的驚喜比預計的要多得多。
When we buy business, we try to look out and estimate the cash it will generate and compare it to the purchase price. We have to feel pretty good about our projections and then have a purchase price that makes sense. Over time, we've had more pleasant surprises than we would have expected.
我還沒有見過哪家投行在它們的研究報告中預測一家企業的未來收益會不斷降低，但實際情況是很多企業的收益會不如上一年度。我們在Dexter鞋業也犯了同類錯誤——去年該公司的税前利潤是4000萬美元，我認為這個成績可以得以維持，但我大錯特錯了。在未來5年中，財富500的公司中，會有20%公司的利潤會出現大幅度下降，當然我不知道具體是哪些公司。如果你無法對此形成合理的預測，那麼就不要糾結這一點了。
I've never seen an investment banker's book in which future earnings are projected to go down. But many businesses' earnings go down. We made this mistake with Dexter shoes -- it was earning $40 million pretax and I projected this would continue, and I couldn't have been more wrong. 20% of Fortune 500 companies will be earning significant less in five years, but I don't know which 20%. If you can't come up with reasonable estimates for that, then you move on.
問3：在確定內在價值過程中，你認為哪些工具是最重要的？在使用這些工具時，遵循什麼規則和標準？
Q3: What do you believe to be the most important tools in determining intrinsic value? What rules or standards do you apply when using these tools?
答3：對於任一項生意，如果我們能夠計算出其未來一百年內的現金流，然後以一個合適的利率折現回現在，那麼就可以得到一個代表內在價值的數字。這就像一個一百年後到期的債券，在債券的下面會有很多的息票。生意也存在「息票」，唯一的問題那些「息票」並不是像債券那樣打印在其下面，而是需要依靠投資者去估算未來的生意會附帶一個什麼樣的「息票」。對於高科技類的生意，或具有類似屬性的生意，會附帶一個什麼樣的「息票」，我們基本沒有概念。對於我們瞭解得比較深入的生意，我們試圖將其息票「打印」出來。如果你想要計算內在價值，唯一可以依靠的就是現金流。你要將現金投入到任意一項投資中，你的目的都是期望你投入的生意在此後能夠為你帶來更多的現金流入，而不是期望把它賣給別人獲利。後者僅僅是誰戰勝誰的遊戲。如果你是一個投資者，你的注意力集中在資產的表現上；如果你是一個投機者，你的注意力集中在價格會如何變化——這不是我們擅長的遊戲。我們認為，如果我們對生意的認識是正確的，我們就能夠掙到錢；如果我們對生意的認識是錯誤的，我們就無法獲利。
A3：If we could see in looking at any business what its future cash flows would be for the next 100 years, and discount that back at an appropriate interest rate, that would give us a number for intrinsic value. It would be like looking at a bond that had a bunch of coupons on it that was due in a hundred years ... Businesses have coupons too, the only problem is that they're not printed on the instrument and it's up to the investor to try to estimate what those coupons are going to be over time. In high-tech businesses, or something like that, we don't have the faintest idea what the coupons are going to be. In the businesses where we think we can understand them reasonably well, we are trying to print the coupons out. If you attempt to assess intrinsic value, it all relates to cash flow. The only reason to put cash into any kind of investment now is that you expect to take cash out--not by selling it to somebody else, that's just a game of who beats who--but by the asset itself ... If you're an investor, you're looking on what the asset is going to do, if you're a speculator, you're commonly focusing on what the price of the object is going to do, and that's not our game. We feel that if we're right about the business, we're going to make a lot of money, and if we're wrong about the business, we don't have any hopes of making money.
[芒格：在優選投資組合的過程中，我認為機會成本的概念非常有用。如果你有一個好的、適用資金規模比較大的、優於其它98%的投資機會，那你就應該放棄其它98%......這樣一來，你就可以形成一個非常緊湊的投資組合。我們的做法非常簡單，但是卻並不廣為別人接受，我不知道為什麼會這樣。即使是在知名大學或者高級研究機構也是如此。這裏就有一個非常有趣的問題：如果我們是對的，那麼，為什麼那麼多人都錯了？]
[CM: I would argue that one filter that's useful in investing is the idea of opportunity costs. If you have one idea that's available in large quantity that's better than 98% of the other opportunities, then you can just screen out the other 98% ... With this attitude you get a concentrated portfolio, which we don't mind. That practice of ours which is so simple is not widely copied, I don't know why. Even at great universities and intellectual institutions. It's an interesting question: If we're right, why are so many other places so wrong.]
對於這個問題，可能有以下幾個答案！我們首先要問自己的是，如果看中一家公司，我們是願意買入那家公司，還是願意將買入那家公司的錢買入更多可口可樂股份或者更多吉列股份……，我們希望買入像可樂或吉列那樣前景比較確定的公司，否則我們就會認為增持可口可樂才是明智之舉。在買入一項生意之前，如果每個經營者都問一問該項買賣是否比買入我們的公司或可口可樂的股票更好的話，那麼，收購活動將會少很多。我們儘量考察自己的行為是否更接近我們能力範圍內可以達到完美。
There are several possible answers to that question! The first question we ask ourselves is, would we rather own this business than more Coca-Cola, than more Gillette .... We will want companies where the certainty gets close to that, or we would figure we'd be better off buying more Coke. If every management, before they bought a business, said is this better than buying in our own stock or even buying Coca-Cola stock, there'd be a lot less deals done. We try to measure against what we regard as close to perfection as we can get.
問4：能否給大家聊聊你那幾只所謂的"必須持有股"的內在價值？
Q4: Could you comment on the matter of intrinsic value as it applies to some of the Inevitables?
答4：好的，但我不願給它們一個具體的價格。這些企業都是非常棒的，並由傑出的經理們經營着，並且目前的股價高於過去大多數時間的股價。無論是從現在的角度看，還是從未來幾年的角度看，現在的價格都物有所值。吉列從來不回購股票……，而可樂經常回購。
A4：Well, we won't stick a price on it. They are absolutely wonderful businesses run by sensational people, and they are selling at prices that are higher than they've sold at most of the time. But they may well be worth it, either in present terms, or they may be a couple of years ahead of themselves. Gillette doesn't repurchase their shares ... Coke consistently repurchases their shares.
一般情況下，我比較喜歡那些經營着好生意且愛回購自己股票的公司。但多數回購自己股票的公司所存在的問題在於它們本身的生意非常一般，它們回購股票的目的不是為了增進股東在好生意中所佔的權益。
We generally like the policy of companies that have really wonderful businesses repurchasing their shares. The problem with most companies repurchasing their shares is that they are frequently so-so businesses and they are repurchasing shares for purposes other than intensifying the interest of shareholders in a wonderful business.
在我們所生活的世界裏，明智地使用資金並不容易，但是可口可樂在運用資金方面非常聰明，特別是在世界範圍內完善裝瓶業務網絡這一點上。瞭解到這一點，你就會覺得多買些像可口可樂這樣的公司（會感覺很棒）。
It's hard to do things intelligently with money in this world and Coke has been very intelligent about using their capital, particularly to fortify and develop their bottler network around the world, but there's only so far you can go with that, and to enhance the ownership of shareholders in a company like Coca-Cola [is great].
問5：在估算內在價值時，對於像麥當勞和沃爾格林等資本密集型企業，它們非常健康且不斷增長的營運現金流被用在了開新店，這種情況你要怎麼估算未來的自由現金流呢？折現率又是多少呢？
Q5: When you estimate intrinsic value in capital intensive companies like McDonald's and Walgreens where a very healthy and growing operating cash flow is largely offset by expenditures for new stores, restaurants, etc how do you estimate future free cash flow? And at what rate do you discount those cash flows?
答5：對於不同股票，我們使用相同的折現率。在某些情況下，我們在預測現金流時，可能會更保守一些。
A5：We use the same discount rate across all securities. We may be more conservative in estimating cash in some situations.
並不是因為利率為1.5%，我們就會喜歡2-3%回報率的投資。我們有一個比國家現行利率高很多的投資收益率門檻。當我們考察一樁生意時，我們考慮的是長期持有，我們不會認為利率會一直這麼低。
Just because interest rates are at 1.5% doesn't mean we like an investment that yields 2-3%. We have minimum thresholds in our mind that are a whole lot higher than government rates. When we're looking at a business, we're looking at holding it forever, so we don't assume rates will always be this low.
我沒有一個嚴格的折現率。每當談起這個問題時，查理總是提醒我還沒有準備一個運算表格，但是這樣的表格已經在我的腦子裏了。
We don’t formally have discount rates. Every time we start talking about this, Charlie reminds me that I’ve never prepared a spreadsheet, but I do in my mind.
我們希望買入的生意，其回報率能夠高於政府債券——問題的關鍵是高多少？如果政府債券的收益是2%，我們不會買入回報率是4%的生意。
We just try to buy things that we’ll earn more from than a government bond – the question is, how much higher? If government bonds are at 2%, we’re not going to buy a business that will return 4%.
我不會每天給查理打電話問他：「我們的收益率門檻是多少？」我們從不使用這個概念。
I don’t call Charlie every day and ask him, 「What’s our hurdle rate?」 We’ve never used the term.
（芒格：收益率門檻只是一個沒有意義的概念，但是很多人在這上面犯了很多嚴重錯誤。在考察很多投資時要分別對比每個投資的回報率，我覺得還沒有一個好的選擇可以代替這種考察方法。）
Munger: The concept of a hurdle rate makes nothing but sense, but a lot of people using this make terrible errors. I don’t think there’s any substitute for thinking about a whole lot of investment options and thinking about the returns from each.
（芒格：問題不在於我們沒有（收益率門檻值）——我們實際上是有的——但這來自於邏輯上的對比。如果存在一項投資鐵定可以帶來8%的收益，那麼對於7%的收益率，我們一定會馬上拒絕。就像在《郵購新娘》中的情節那樣，如果新娘公司給你郵來的新娘攜帶艾滋病毒，我就不會浪費時間去考慮。一切都是機會成本在起作用。）
The trouble isn’t that we don’t have one [a hurdle rate] – we sort of do – but it interferes with logical comparison. If I know I have something that yields 8% for sure, and something else came along at 7%, I’d reject it instantly. It’s like the mail-order-bride firm offering a bride who has AIDS – I don’t need to waste a moment considering it. Everything is a function of opportunity cost.
問6：判斷風險的能力與計算內在價值的能力是否同樣重要？
答6：我們將風險視為未來對生意產生負面影響的各因素。我們希望能夠得到一系列決策的量化風險而不是介入存在一系列具有可見風險的生意。我們希望介入的生意能夠存在護城河。同時，我們還希望介入生意的護城河能夠得到不斷拓寬。不斷拓寬的護城河才是好生意的最重要標誌。
A6：We perceive risk as items that impair future business. Wants to have mathematical risk on their side over a group of decisions. Not in the business of assuming a lot of risk in business. We look for moats around businesses. We look for castles (businesses) that have a moat surrounding it which is expanding as a primary consideration of a great business.
問7：您用的是什麼估值指標？
Q7: What valuation metrics do you use?
與標準普爾500指數相比，一樁生意的合理PE倍數取決於該生意的淨資產回報率和增量投資資本回報率。我不會只考察相對PE倍數等單一估值指標。我也不認為PE、PB、PS等指標能為你提供很多有價值的信息。大家想有一個公式，但得到這麼一個公式並不容易。想要對什麼進行估值，你只需計算出從現在到遙遠的未來它能夠產生的自由現金流，然後利用一個合適的折現率將這個現金流折算到現在就可以了。現金等於現金。你只需評估一樁生意的經濟屬性。
The appropriate multiple for a business compared to the S&P 500 depends on its return on equity and return on incremental invested capital. I wouldn't look at a single valuation metric like relative P/E ratio. I don't think price-to-earnings, price-to-book or price-to-sales ratios tell you very much. People want a formula, but it's not that easy. To value something, you simply have to take its free cash flows from now until kingdom come and then discount them back to the present using an appropriate discount rate. All cash is equal. You just need to evaluate a business's economic characteristics.
問8：投資決策中，如何使用賬面價值？
Q8: What do you think of the use of book values in making investment decisions?
（備註：下面這兩段話似乎是以別人的口吻轉述的，所以語言結構是轉述的，而且兩段間的意思並不是非常連貫。）
在伯克希爾的投資決策中，賬面價值實際上沒有起到任何作用。他們對高回報率生意的追求，通常會導致其投資的公司具有較小的帳目價值。他還補充説，若管理的資金量較小，賬面價值法可能會獲得較好的應用效果，就像格雷厄姆所管理的公司那樣，該方法在類似格雷厄姆的從業者——像巴菲特的朋友Walter Schloss——身上也有非常好的效果。格雷厄姆在《聰明的投資者》一書中所闡述的三個最重要的理念是：1）投資者對市場應該採取什麼樣的態度；2）安全邊際；以及3）把公司看成生意而不是股票。
Book value is virtually not a consideration in investment decision-making at Berkshire. Their pursuit of high return businesses usually leads to companies with minimal book values. He added that the book value approach could work well with small sums of money, like Graham had managed, and that the approach had worked well for Graham-type practitioners like Buffett’s friend Walter Schloss. The three most important concepts conveyed by Graham in 「The Intelligent Investor」 were the investor’s attitude toward the market, the 「margin of safety」, and the practice of looking at companies as businesses, not stocks.
查理·芒格的觀點是「預測股價不但不會帶來什麼好處，反而是有害的。通常情況下，提供預測的人往往會從實現這種預測上獲得好處。他們的預測也經常可以得到「正確」的結果，但這種正確極具欺騙性。」 巴菲特補充説他們從來不在併購活動中對感興趣的生意或股權進行預測。「首先考慮公司執行層或董事會要做的事情是否合理已經成為了一種慣例。」
Munger proffered that 「projections generally do more harm than good, and are usually prepared by persons who have some sort of an interest in the outcome of actions based on the projections. They often have a precision that’s deceptive.」 Buffett added that they’ve never looked at a projection in connection with an equity or business that they’ve acquired. 「It’s a ritual to justify doing what an executive or a board wanted to do in the first place.」
問9：如果你不接觸管理層，不看年報，也不知道股價，只看財務報表，你會關注哪一項指標？
Q9: If you can’t talk with management, and can’t read the annual report, and didn’t know the price, but could only look at the financial statements, what metric would you look at?
答9：巴菲特：投資就是出讓你現有資金的使用權，以期在將來得到更多的現金。我們先把價格放在一邊。如果你要買一個農場，你會首先考慮這個農場的單位產量——此時你就是在關注資產本身。你會問自己：我是否對經營農場有足夠的經驗以至於通過其當前的經營狀況所提供的有用信息可以預測其將來的財物狀況？我就是根據你買農場的這種思路來買股票的。這些股票必須屬於我熟悉的行業，如果我能夠以內在價值40%的價格買入股票，我就具備了足夠的安全邊際。如果你不告訴生意的性質，報表能夠告訴我的信息就非常有限。我們買入過很多有價證券，我們與其中多數公司的管理層沒有見過面。我們只是依靠自己對生意的一般理解到報表中尋找我們感興趣的東西。
A9：WB: Investing is laying out money now to get more money later on. Let’s leave the market price out. If you were buying a farm, you would think about bushels per acre — you are looking to the asset itself. Ask yourself: do I understand enough about the business so that the financials will be able to tell me meaningful things that will help me to foresee the statements in the future? I have bought stocks the way you describe. They were in businesses I understood, and if I could buy at 40% of X, I’d be okay with the margin of safety. If you don’t tell me the nature of the business, financial statements won’t tell me much. We’ve bought many securities, and with most, we’ve never met management. We use our general understanding of business and look to specifics from financial statements.
芒格：有一個指標（——現金）深受歡迎，我們喜愛擁有大量現金的生意。與之相反，不喜歡擁有大量建築設備的生意，忙碌了一年，你的利潤卻躺在院子裏。我們會盡量避免涉足後面那類生意。我們更喜歡在年底能給我們開出支票的生意。
CM: One metric catches people. We prefer businesses that drown in cash. An example of a different business is construction equipment. You work hard all year and there is your profit sitting in the yard. We avoid businesses like that. We prefer those that can write us a check at the end of the year.
巴菲特：如果我們知道一套公寓的位置，我們就可以知道這套公寓的價值，我們也會知道擁有這套公寓的每月花費是多少。我買入過很多財務上出現困難的公司，但是有一些這類公司我是永遠都不會買入，即使它們擁有世界上最優秀的管理團隊，因為在一個「爛」行業裏，優秀的管理團隊並不能起多少作用。
WB: We could value an apartment if we knew where the apartment is, and we know the monthly checks. I have bought a lot of things off the financials. There is a lot I wouldn’t buy even if it had the best management in the world, as it doesn’t make much difference in a bad business.
問10：當你評估一樁生意時，你如何看待其成長性？
Q10: How do you think about growth rates when you value businesses?
如果一樁生意的[長期]增長率高於折現率，從數學上講，其價值是無限的。這就是由Durand在三十年前提出的聖彼得堡悖論。（此處提供了原文鏈接地址，同時推薦了莫布森的文章—《由聖彼得堡悖論得出的兩點認識》）有些管理層就這麼認識他們的公司。假設增長沒有限制是非常危險——很多麻煩來源於此。預計超常的高速增長可以長期持續導致投資者損失大量的金錢。回頭看看50年前的優秀企業，有多少能夠長期保持10%的增長率？那些有增長的企業，能達到15%增長率的更是鳳毛麟角。我和查理都不願意預測企業會長期高速增長。有時候我們可能是錯的，這種錯誤也會帶來損失，但是我們喜歡這種保守。
When the [long-term] growth rate is higher than the discount rate, then [mathematically] the value is infinity. This is the St. Petersburg Paradox, written about by Durand 30 years ago. [Click here for a copy of the original 1957 article. For more on this topic, I recommend Integrating the Outliers: Two Lessons from the St. Petersburg Paradox, by CSFB’s (now Legg Mason’s) Michael Mauboussin.].Some managements think this [that the value of their company is infinite]. It gets very dangerous to assume high growth rates to infinity – that’s where people get into a lot of trouble. The idea of projecting extremely high growth rates for a long period of time has cost investors an awful lot of money. Go look at top companies 50 years ago: how many have grown at 10% for a long time? And [those that have grown] 15% is very rarified. Charlie and I are rarely willing to project high growth rates. Maybe we’re wrong sometimes and that costs us, but we like to be conservative.
[芒格：如果你使用的增長率過高，導致你得到的企業價值無限大，那麼你應該採用一個更為現實的增長率數據。除此之外，你還能做什麼呢？]
[CM: If your growth rate is so high that you conclude the business has an infinite valuation, you have to use more realistic numbers. What else could anyone do?]
編輯/isaac