In November 2025, the U.S. cryptocurrency market witnessed a historic moment—nearly two years after the successful operation of Bitcoin and Ethereum spot ETFs, the first wave of altcoin ETFs was finally approved for listing.
Four altcoin ETFs—Litecoin, XRP, Solana, and Dogecoin—experienced markedly different fates. XRP and Solana collectively attracted over $1.3 billion in institutional funds, emerging as the absolute winners in the market; in contrast, Litecoin and Dogecoin faced complete indifference, with combined inflows of less than $8 million.
This report conducts a comparative analysis of the performance of the four major altcoin ETFs, delves into their inter-market impact, and forecasts how subsequent ETFs will influence market trends.
Part One: The Dichotomy of the Four ETFs
XRP: The Biggest Winner Among Altcoin ETFs
XRP was undoubtedly the winner of November. As of November 27, the total assets of six XRP ETFs reached $676 million, maintaining a record of zero outflow days since their launch. On November 13, Canary Capital's XRPC debut generated a net inflow of $245 million, marking the strongest ETF debut of 2025. Subsequently, daily inflows averaged between $15 million and $25 million, with an additional $164 million added on November 24 when Grayscale and Franklin Templeton joined. More crucially, amid a bleak market in November, the price of XRP rose from $2.08 to $2.23, a 7.2% increase, making it the only altcoin to achieve positive growth.
The success of XRP can be attributed to three key factors:
- Regulatory clarity was the most critical factor: In August 2025, Ripple settled with the SEC for $125 million, based on Judge Torres' ruling that "XRP in the secondary market is not a security," providing institutional investors with reassurance.
- Practical narratives provided support: RippleNet collaborates with over 200 financial institutions, allowing institutions to position themselves as investing in "financial infrastructure" rather than engaging in speculative ventures.
- Fee competition created an advantage: Franklin's XRPZ offers free services for the first $5 billion until May 2026, directly challenging Grayscale's 0.35% fee.
ETFs are more like amplifiers, converting these positive factors into actual institutional capital inflows.
Solana: $600 million inflow but a 29% plunge
The total assets of Solana's six ETFs reached $918 million, with cumulative net inflows of $613 million, comparable to XRP. However, the price plummeted from $195-205 to $142.92, marking a 29.2% decline.
ETF inflows were powerless in the face of systemic risk. On November 21, Bitcoin flash-crashed from $126,000 to $80,000, triggering $90 billion in on-chain liquidations. Solana, as a high-risk altcoin, was hit the hardest. Daily ETF buying of $20-30 million was negligible compared to the selling pressure. A deeper issue lies in the ETF arbitrage mechanism: market makers hedge by selling SOL in the spot market, which exacerbates the downward trend during declines.
However, Solana has a unique advantage: staking yields. All Solana ETFs offer annualized returns of 6-8% starting from day one. After deducting a 0.20% management fee, BSOL’s net return is approximately 7%—a 'profitable ETF' that continues to attract institutions even amid price crashes.
Litecoin and Dogecoin: Abandoned by the Market
Once known as 'digital silver,' Litecoin has been abandoned by the market. LTCC’s total assets stand at only $7.42 million, less than 3% of XRP's first-day figure, with a 24-hour trading volume of just $267,000. The lack of narrative ('faster Bitcoin' is outdated), fee disadvantages (0.95%, 2-3 times higher than BTC ETFs), and liquidity traps (low AUM leads to wider spreads and institutional avoidance) are the main reasons for LTC's lack of appeal.Dogecoin fared even worse. The total assets of its three ETFs amounted to $6.48 million, with net inflows of $2.2 million. Grayscale's GDOG had a first-day trading volume of only $1.4 million. Meme coins fundamentally conflict with institutional demand: a permanent 3.3% annual inflation rate dilutes value, no supply cap/smart contracts/DeFi support exists, and institutions cannot buy simply because 'Elon likes it.' Additionally, whale sell-offs from September to November further deepened market pessimism.
Part Two: Born Amidst the Storm
Bitcoin and Ethereum ETFs’ bleak November
To understand the performance of altcoin ETFs, we must place them within a broader market context. November 2025 was the worst month for Bitcoin and Ethereum ETFs since their listing in January 2024. Eleven Bitcoin spot ETFs recorded cumulative net outflows of $3.5 billion to $3.79 billion in November. More alarming, however, was the persistence of these outflows: net outflows occurred on 16 of the 20 trading days in November, accounting for 80% of the month.
On November 21, the day Bitcoin plummeted to $80,000, single-day outflows reached $903 million, marking the second-largest daily outflow in Bitcoin ETF history. BlackRock's IBIT, the largest and most institutionally favored Bitcoin ETF, was not spared. This product, once regarded as a "perpetual motion machine," experienced outflows of $2.2 billion in November, setting its worst monthly record since its listing. The situation for Ethereum ETFs was equally grim, with nine Ethereum spot ETFs collectively losing approximately $500 million in November.
Combined, Bitcoin and Ethereum ETFs saw total outflows exceeding $4 billion in November. Behind this figure lies a collapse in institutional investor confidence in the cryptocurrency market. As Bitcoin dropped from $126,000 to $80,000, hedge funds, family offices, and other institutions opted to cut losses and exit the market. The convenient redemption mechanism offered by ETFs accelerated this process.
Two Parallel Worlds
Amidst this wreckage, altcoin ETFs attracted inflows of $1.3 billion. This contrast may appear contradictory but actually reflects the existence of two parallel worlds.
First: the retreat of traditional financial institutions. The $4 billion outflows from Bitcoin and Ethereum ETFs primarily came from traditional financial institutions. These institutions entered the market heavily when the BTC ETF launched in early 2024, when Bitcoin was priced at $40,000–$50,000. By the time Bitcoin reached $126,000 in November, many had already secured paper profits of 200–250%. The flash crash triggered their risk control mechanisms—when drawdowns exceeded 20–30%, they were required to reduce positions. In times of tightened risk appetite, these institutions exited the crypto space entirely rather than shifting to other crypto assets.
Second: the entry of crypto-native institutions. The $1.3 billion inflows into altcoin ETFs likely stemmed from a completely different group of investors. Crypto-native hedge funds, venture capital firms, and high-net-worth crypto enthusiasts, who have higher tolerance for market volatility, viewed the November crash not as a signal to retreat but as an opportunity to allocate to new products. More importantly, altcoin ETFs had only been listed for 2–3 weeks, and many institutional initial allocation orders had been planned months before the listing. Once initiated, these orders would not be canceled due to short-term fluctuations.
This market stratification explains a key phenomenon: why did Solana ETFs maintain positive inflows of approximately $12 million on November 21, the day of the Bitcoin flash crash, while Bitcoin ETFs saw single-day outflows of $903 million? Because the holders of the two ETFs represent entirely different investor groups with distinct risk appetites, investment objectives, and decision-making mechanisms.
The Limits of the New Product Effect
This is not a case of "capital rotation from Bitcoin to altcoins," but rather more indicative of the "new product effect"—initial allocations by investors to new ETFs, market makers' position-building needs, and retail inflows driven by media hype, all of which are natural phenomena accompanying new product launches.
The effect of new products has its temporal boundaries. The Solana ETF experienced its first outflow on November 26, breaking a record of 21 consecutive days of inflows. This turning point is significant—it marks the end of the "new product honeymoon period" and the beginning of "true market testing." After initial allocation orders are completed, market makers have finished building positions, and media attention has waned, the ETF must rely on the underlying fundamentals of the asset to attract capital.
This also explains why Litecoin and Dogecoin have performed so poorly. They too enjoyed the label of "new products," but even during the honeymoon period attracted less than $8 million in inflows. This demonstrates that the effect of new products has its limits—assets without a strong narrative and practical value cannot attract sufficient capital even when packaged as ETFs.
Summary: Opportunities and Challenges of the Times
The listing of altcoin ETFs in November 2025 marks the entry of the cryptocurrency market into a new phase. This is not merely the launch of a few new products but represents a fundamental shift in the overall market structure and participant composition. Institutional investors now have compliant and convenient tools to allocate altcoins, and the bridge between traditional finance and cryptocurrencies is accelerating its formation.
In the ETF era, "fame" and "historical standing" are no longer sufficient conditions for attracting capital. Only assets with a strong practical narrative, clear regulatory status, and an active ecosystem will truly benefit from ETF-ization.
By mid-2026, the U.S. market may see 200-250 cryptocurrency ETFs trading. However, this does not mean all ETFs will succeed. As we have observed with Litecoin and Dogecoin, assets without a compelling narrative and practical value...
The ETF market will undergo a process of natural selection. The top 5-10 products will capture the majority of market share, benefiting from economies of scale and network effects. The middle tier will consist of 20-30 mediocre products, barely maintaining operations. However, a large number of tail-end products will be liquidated after struggling for one or two years. While this process may be painful, it is necessary—only through market competition can truly valuable assets be identified.
