The above words, from the US Newsweek on January 23, 2006, if it were not for "Seoul" and "Samsung", it would be hard to think of such a scene in South Korea-after all, many people's inherent impressions of this country are eye-catching labels such as "the four Little Dragons of Asia" and "the Miracle of East Asia", as well as the urban atmosphere, white-collar elites and romantic scenes in idol dramas.

Now, the emergence of the new Oscar Best Picture "Parasite" shows the world a little-known side of South Korea: the huge gap between the rich and the poor and the class gap, the bottom and the upper class. the "smell" between each other is so insurmountable. This is also a true portrayal of Korean society.

As the 11th largest economic country in the world, South Korea's economic success is self-evident.However, since the beginning of the new century, the imbalance in the country's economic and social development is not optimistic, the most direct manifestation is the increasing number of poor people, the shrinking size of the middle class, while the rich are richer than ever. In response, former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said at the first cabinet meeting in 2006 that economic inequality was now his "most distressing social problem."Some South Korean scholars even say that this polarization has become a "time bomb".

Freezing was not built in a day, and the "fragmentation" of South Korea's economy and society was not built overnight. If we make an in-depth analysis, the root of all this lies in the "chaebol model" formed in the process of South Korea's economic development.

I. the birth of the Miracle of the Han River

On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was established. With the support of the Americans, Li Seung-Man was elected the first president.

Due to his long career of wandering abroad in his early years, Li Seung-Man lacked a solid political foundation at home. After he became president, he wantonly carried out dictatorship. "First unification and then construction, no unity and no construction.」。

As for the economy, the Li Seung-Man government is mainly dependent on American aid. Public data show that from 1953 to 1960, after the end of the Korean War, the United States gave South Korea 1.745 billion US dollars in economic aid, and the United Nations Korean Rehabilitation Agency also provided 120 million US dollars. But Li Seung-Man, who is sitting on such a huge amount of aid, did not spend the huge amount of money on nation-building, but was bent on moving northward by force.

As a result, the economy of the whole country is depressed and the people are living in poverty. Wait until the presidential election in 1960, Li Seung-Man because of fraud triggered public revolt, the outbreak of the April 19 Movement, due to the pressure of the public and international public opinion, Li Seung-Man stepped down and went into exile in Hawaii, and died in the United States five years later.

After a brief transition from Yoon Yoon-sun's government, South Korea ushered in its third president, Park Chung-hee, in 1961-52 years later, by the way.His eldest daughter, Park Geun-hye, will also run the country.。

In the year when Park Chung-hee came to power, South Korea's economy could not be worse. Not only was the per capita GDP of its neighbor North Korea only 1% of that of its neighbor North Korea, but its output in other areas was even worse (see chart below). Because of this, it has become a top priority for South Korea to go all out to develop its economy. Against this background, Park Chung-hee changed the idea of being in power during the Li Seung-Man period and advocated that economic construction was the top priority.We need to have a good life, too."the promise. This is not only out of a strong desire for the people of the whole country to quickly get rid of poverty and achieve national prosperity, but also the key to seeking economic independence and getting rid of dependence on American aid.

After the goal was set, Park Chung-hee government began to plan and promote a comprehensive economic development plan, the most representative of which is the formulation and implementation of the "five-year Plan for Economic Development". The highlight of the plan is that it includes the design of the overall situation of South Korea's economic development, including investment, resource allocation, finance, taxation, industrial policy, trade policy and other areas related to the national economy. The core of the plan lies in the implementation of an export-oriented economic model, which has something to do with South Korea's weak industrial base, lack of resource endowment, backward scientific and technological strength, narrow market size and other realities. On this basisIn 1964, the government put forward slogans such as "Export first" and "Trade Building the country".To promote export orientation as a national strategy.

Since then, driven by the export-oriented economic model, South Korea's economy has officially stepped into the fast lane. According to the timeline, South Korea's economy from 1961 to 1996 can be roughly divided into three stages of development:

Phase I (1960s):When the international labor-intensive industries and some low value-added technology-intensive industries were transferred for the first time, South Korea seized the opportunity, and fiber, textile, daily necessities and other industries were able to rise rapidly.

Phase II (1970s):In January 1973, Park Chung-hee government issued the Declaration on heavy Chemical Industry, which identified steel, petrochemical, automotive, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, non-ferrous metals, cement, ceramics and fiber industries as the top ten strategic investment key industries. and set up the heavy Chemical Industry Promotion Committee headed by the Premier of the State Council to implement the heavy Chemical Industry Development Plan, and the policy and financial focus is tilted to the heavy chemical industry. At the same time, it also actively introduces technology and production equipment, and sets up research institutions to help domestic enterprises grow.

The third stage (1980-1996):Under the influence of the changes in the international and domestic economic situation, South Korea has timely adjusted its development strategy, shifting from technology introduction to "building the country through science and technology", and encourages enterprises to expand their economic scale, improve efficiency, increase investment in research and development, develop new technologies and differentiated products, and then improve product quality and enhance export competitiveness. And electronic information, bioengineering, precision machinery, fine chemicals, new materials, new energy and other high-tech industries have grown up.

The above 30 years is universally recognized as a period of rapid economic growth in South Korea. According to the data, between 1961 and 1996,South Korean GDP soared from US $2.4 billion to US $598.1 billionThe per capita GDP increased from less than US $100 to US $13137.9, successfully surpassing the "middle-income trap" to become one of the high-income countries. In October 1996, South Korea also became the 29th member of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), crossing the threshold of the world's developed economies.

此It is the world-famous "Han River miracle", and Park Chung-hee is recognized as the creator of this miracle.。

It should be noted that in addition to the export-oriented economic development model, the emergence of the "Han River Miracle" is also inseparable from the promotion of many large South Korean enterprises, which have another common name-chaebol.

Second, how can the chaebol help South Korea's economic growth?

Chaebol was originally the general name of Japanese financial monopoly capital group before World War II. In essence, South Korea's "chaebol" refers to a group of large private enterprises with good economic benefits and strong competitiveness developed under the support and guidance of the state. The famous multinational giants such as Samsung, Hyundai, SK, LG, Han Hua and Rakuten are typical representatives of chaebol.

The plutocrats in South Korea began in the Li Seung-Man period and flourished after Park Chung-hee came to power.。As we all know, industrial policy takes enterprises as the carrier, and from the policy orientation of "export first" at that time, if we want to send more local products out of the country, we must rely on a number of leading enterprises with sufficient competitiveness. However, as a "late-developing modern" country, if South Korea simply relies on the market economy and the spontaneous competition of enterprises, it is difficult to rapidly develop a large number of large enterprises with strong strength in a short period of time.

Under this background, Park Chung-hee government began to adopt the way of "concentrating efforts to do great things" to cultivate and support some large-scale or potential private enterprises, and to promote their growth through preferential policies such as taxes and loans. Enterprises with more outstanding economic achievements and sectors where the government wants to promote development are more likely to get support and positive incentives, while ordinary small and medium-sized enterprises are often excluded from policy support because it is difficult to achieve good results, which in turn accelerates the concentration of capital. In this process, the relationship between the government and enterprises has been reasonably defined, that is, the government pursues economic development plans, while enterprises pursue profits; although capable enterprises are supported by the government, they have full autonomy. The government rarely intervenes in its specific business activities.

In this way, a number of big chaebol enterprises were born, and in the "Han River Miracle", they played a huge role:

First, chaebol enterprises have improved the efficiency of South Korean economic growth.

In terms of production efficiency and economic benefits, chaebol enterprises are obviously better than small and medium-sized enterprises. Some studies have shown that in terms of production efficiency, the production of chaebol enterprises increased by 79.5 times in the 12 years from 1960 to 1972, while that of small and medium-sized enterprises increased by only 16.2 times in the same period. In terms of economic benefits, the proportion of the total output value of chaebol enterprises in the entire manufacturing industry increased from 33.6% in 1960 to 72.1% in 1972, while the proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises decreased from 66.4% to 27.9%. The relationship between the two has fundamentally changed. With the strengthening of the dominant position of the chaebol in the South Korean economy, their effect on improving the overall economic efficiency has become more and more prominent, which has played a positive role in promoting the take-off of the South Korean economy.

Second, chaebol enterprises have led South Korea's industrial upgrading and technological progress.

According to the changes of the economic situation and the needs of its own development, the South Korean government has formulated different industrial policies in different periods, and the key industries are also different. According to the above, since the 1960s, South Korea's key industries have generally experienced an iterative upgrading process from labor-intensive industries to heavy chemical industries, and then to high-tech industries. In each stage, it is the chaebol enterprises that play the role of "forerunner". They improve their internal structure and layout focus according to the adjustment of the government's development strategy in different periods, which in turn promotes the industrial upgrading and technological progress of South Korea.

For example, after the Korean government issued the Declaration on heavy Chemical industrialization in 1971, chaebol companies have shifted their business focus to areas related to heavy chemical industry, such as Hyundai Group actively involved in the shipbuilding market, but also newly built Hyundai Weipu Shipbuilding and other enterprises. In the 1980s, almost all the major heavy chemical industries in South Korea fell into the hands of the big chaebol, and the efforts of the chaebol enterprises in the heavy chemical industry directly led to the successful realization of the Korean government's industrial policy.

Third, chaebol enterprises have enhanced South Korea's international competitiveness.

In addition to expanding the domestic market, chaebol enterprises also actively participate in international competition, and lead the world in many fields such as semiconductors, display panels, new materials, mobile phones, cars, ships and related spare parts. Giants represented by Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo have all been on the list of the world's top 500, and more and more international capital and technology have been attracted to South Korea, forming a virtuous circle. In addition, the chaebol enterprises also accommodate a considerable amount of labor force, and the chaebol have higher requirements for the quality of their employees, so they are more strict and formal in staff training, which to a certain extent improves the overall quality of Korean employees.

With the support of the government and its own efforts, the economic resources of the whole of South Korea are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small number of plutocrats. By 2017, the revenue of Samsung, Hyundai, SK, LG, Han Hua and Rakuten accounted for more than 60% of South Korea's GDP, and Samsung alone accounted for more than 20% of South Korea's GDP.The industrial fields of these six chaebol cover petroleum, chemical industry, gas, iron making, construction, shipping, automobile, electronics, information and communications, semiconductors, logistics, finance, medicine, fashion products and other fields.It not only controls the lifeblood of South Korea's economy, but also has an important impact on the global economy.

However, such a powerful plutocrat, alsoIt has become a hidden danger to the healthy development of South Korea's economy and society.。

III. South Korea under the shadow of plutocrats

Although chaebol enterprises have led South Korea to embark on the path of rapid economic growth, some chaebol enterprises with high debt, high credit and low profits have begun to emerge on the soil of government support and protection. Especially in the early 1990s, after South Korea opened its capital account, foreign capital mainly in the form of bank loans continued to pour into South Korea, and many South Korean chaebol borrowed from domestic banks as well as foreign banks, resulting in more and more serious debt accumulation.

In 1997, the Asian financial crisis broke out. Under the impact of the foreign exchange crisis in Southeast Asia, South Korean companies are unable to repay their foreign debts due, while foreign creditors refuse to extend credit to South Korean companies and financial institutions. As a result, since the end of 1997, South Korean chaebol collapsed like clay giants, and large industrial enterprises went bankrupt one after another, including 6 of the top 30 chaebol in China. At the same time, the South Korean government, which has high bad and bad bank debts, a severe economic downturn and a sharp drop in foreign exchange reserves, has no choice but to accept the harsh conditions of the IMF to get loan assistance.

At this point, the South Korean government gradually realized the disadvantages and fragility of the chaebol model, and began to carry out a series of rectification and reform, including adjusting the business content and structure of chaebol enterprises, supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, improving transparency, and so on. As a result, South Korea has gradually stepped out of the quagmire of crisis, and economic operation and enterprise management have begun to return to the right track.

However, more than a decade later, South Korean chaebol enterprises are once again in trouble:

(1) Rakuten Group:The situation has occurred frequently since 2015, such as problems in the construction of the Rakuten World Tower, continuous delays in the opening time, and the Xin brothers' struggle for power, and so on; senior leaders have been under prosecution's full investigation since June 2016 on suspicion of dereliction of duty, embezzlement of public funds, illegal fund-raising and so on. Li Renyuan, the No. 2 figure, hanged himself and affected the group's business expansion.

(2) Hyundai Automobile:Since September 26, 2016, the Hyundai Automobile Union has stopped production lines at Hyundai's Ulsan, Jeonju and Yashan factories because of improved treatment issues such as higher salaries. This is another large-scale strike by Hyundai Automobile Union since 2004. The number of participants reached 50,000, nearly 75% of the total number of Hyundai auto workers in Korea, resulting in more than 10 billion output loss.

Correspondingly, South Korea's economic growth is weak, and South Korea's GDP growth has been hovering in a range of 2% to 3% since 2012 (see chart below).

The problem of chaebol enterprises and the persistently depressed South Korean economy have made people more and more realize that although South Korea has made a lot of reforms and adjustments, the foundation of chaebol enterprises is too deep. As a result, the "sequelae" of the chaebol model still flow in the blood of the South Korean economy, and a series of deep-seated economic problems they have brought have not been effectively solved.

On the one hand, seriously squeeze the living space of small and medium-sized enterprises.

As a behemoth in the market competition, the chaebol hold a lot of economic resources, so that small and medium-sized enterprises have almost no opportunity to grow. Especially for those emerging enterprises, it is extremely difficult to get a piece of the Korean market: if the business poses a threat to the existing chaebol, then the chaebol group will force them to withdraw through their own huge power; if the emerging field has better profits and prospects, then the wealthy plutocrats will stretch out their tentacles and set up subsidiaries to set up subsidiaries to get involved in this field, and then seize the living space of emerging enterprises. As a last resort, small and medium-sized enterprises have no choice but to "curry favor" with the chaebol, which in turn encourages the power of the plutocrats.

Second, it leads to the imbalance of resource allocation and low production efficiency.

The quintessence of market economy lies in fair and reasonable competition, otherwise the market mechanism will not work. In the case of South Korea, affected by the power of the chaebol, many new and efficient industries and companies find it difficult to get adequate resources. While many inefficient chaebol subsidiaries clearly have no ability to make money and are burdened with extremely high debts, they can rely on the resource advantages from the group to survive; what is more, some chaebol subsidiaries in order to survive each other, often with mutual funding, collusion with each other to support each other. This kind of "too big to fail" seriously hurts the fair and reasonable competition of the market, restricts the improvement of the efficiency of the allocation of economic resources in the whole society, and then can not make South Korea burst out the new vitality of economic growth.

Third, the entanglement of politics has led to frequent corruption scandals.

Collusion between politics and business is a major stubborn disease in South Korea's economy, and the root cause is that some chaebol enterprises are too powerful and cover up the sky in many fields: on the one hand, the rising plutocrats, sheltered by political generosity, continue to use their close relations with government officials to seek benefits; on the other hand, politicians also rely on the support of the chaebol to participate in the election, but also rely on the chaebol's economic growth to create political achievements. The mutual transfer of interests and mutual support between politicians and plutocrats has become the backstage operation mode of Korean constitutionalism.

In addition, South Korean chaebol also participate in political governance through continuous political contributions, bribing politicians and government officials, and marrying with politicians' children, and the government often has to take into account the "feelings" of chaebol when formulating relevant policies.

In this way, since the founding of the people's Republic of China, almost all South Korean presidents have not been able to end well because of corruption scandals, which is a "Blue House curse." What is most impressive is Park Geun-hye's "best friend meddling" incident in the second half of 2016, when this large-scale power-abusing scandal brought South Korean public dissatisfaction with the chaebol to a peak, followed by nine major plutocrats, including Samsung, Hyundai, SK, LG, Rakuten, Han Hua and Hanjin, who were collectively investigated by the authorities, and all nine leaders attended the hearing and were questioned by members of Congress on the transaction of power and money.

It is the chaebol who drive South Korea's economy to take off, and it is also the chaebol who bring a series of negative effects.

IV. The gap between the rich and the poor and the "spoon class theory"

In addition to the direct economic impact, the chaebol also have a profound impact on the life trajectory of ordinary people in South Korea.

The reason is actually very simple. In South Korea, under the shadow of the chaebol, young people want to have a bright future or get a good salary, almost only by "sharpening their brains" to join the big companies controlled by the chaebol. Because other small and medium-sized enterprises simply do not see hope and no money to make, if they cannot enter a big company, they are basically doomed to a mediocre life.

But the reality is that if you want to get a job in chaebol companies such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG, you must first be admitted to famous universities like SKY (the acronym of South Korea's three most famous universities, including Seoul University, Koryo University and Yonsei University). But throughout the country, the annual enrollment quota of SKY only belongs to a very small number of people, and those who can enter chaebol enterprises after graduation are even less. In this way, the income gap of ordinary Koreans is widening, and the poor account for the vast majority.

Not only that, South Korea's high unemployment rate is also an "old problem", especially the unemployment problem of young people. Since 2016, the youth unemployment rate in South Korea has continued to rise, which has become another disharmonious factor in South Korean society. According to the Korea Herald, the real unemployment rate of South Korean youth is much higher than the previous official figures, and one in four young Koreans do not have a stable job.

The report also said that according to government statistics, the unemployment rate of young people aged 15 to 29 in South Korea is 9.8%, but this figure does not include odd workers and temporary workers, which does not truly reflect the current tight job market in South Korea. If you consider the supplementary data provided by the Korean Bureau of Statistics, including people who work less than 36 hours a week and want to change jobs, as well as those who work on a quarterly basis, the unemployment rate among young people in South Korea should be 23.8%. The corresponding number of unemployed people should exceed 1 million. Data released by OECD also show that people aged 25 to 29 accounted for 21.6% of the unemployed in South Korea in 2018, ranking first among 36 member states for the seventh year in a row.

Based on the income gap and the reality of high unemployment among young peopleIt is not difficult to understand why the fertility rate in South Korea is falling even more off a cliff than in Japan.(see picture below), and regarded by David Coleman, a professor of demography at the University of Oxford, as "the first country to disappear from the earth due to population decline"-how can young people have the mind to have children even though they are still busy?

In fact, plagued by problems such as low income and difficult employment, many young people in South Korea already feel hopeless about the future: young people from good families have better resources to receive high-quality education and enter better companies. or inherit more wealth, while young people with difficult families not only need loans for higher education, but also find it even more difficult to find a good job.

So in recent years, an interesting new theory has spread among South Koreans, called "2030 (20-39 years old) spoon class theory", which is derived from the English saying "born with a silver spoon" (bornwith a silver spoon in one's mouth). In the Class Theory of spoonsAccording to the difference of parents' property level and family background.Young people aged 20 to 39 are divided into four grades: "gold spoon", "silver spoon", "copper spoon" and "clay spoon". As a result, the final educational background and economic conditions of parents will directly affect the fate of their offspring. Specifically:

In the final analysis, "spoon class theory" can basically be equated with "fighting father". Perhaps because of this, most people in South Korea are generally pessimistic about the prospects for their future development. According to the results of the 2015 Social Survey released by South Korea's National Bureau of Statistics, when asked about the possibility of improving their social and economic status in the same generation through their own efforts in a lifetime, only 21.8% answered "very likely", 62.2% said "very unlikely", and the remaining 16% answered "I don't know".In the eyes of many young Koreans, they "can't change anything even if they work hard."

At this point, the seemingly absurd but moving stories in "parasites" seem reasonable, and this is a true portrayal of the serious solidification of the Korean social class.

5. Closing

From the "Han River miracle" many years ago to today's weak economic growth, frequent corruption scandals and serious class solidification, chaebol enterprises can be described as "success and failure".

Through the chaebol model, people can see that South Korea's economic growth is essentially unequal growth, and the fruits of economic development are more enjoyed by a small number of people, while giants like the chaebol are allowed to continue to grow. however, it is obviously not wise to ignore the fairness and fairness of market competition and the diversification of market subjects. How to release the growth vitality of small and medium-sized enterprises, promote the improvement of market efficiency, improve residents' income, improve public welfare and deal with the relationship between the government and the market will be an urgent problem for South Koreans.

In fact, as early as 1982, Olson, a famous economist, made a thought-provoking point of view by using the theory of collective action in his book the rise and fall of the Nation.Strong interest groups have unshirkable responsibility for the decline of the overall strength of the country, and the profit-seeking behavior of strong interest groups will inevitably damage public welfare, increase social costs, and lead to institutional rigidity, thus harming not only social efficiency but also social public.正。

In spite of this, there is still a long way to go to completely liberate South Korea's economy and society from the tyranny of the chaebol. After all, the current South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who came to power in the face of strong public calls for reform, is committed to eliminating the privileges of the chaebol at the same time. His public support is also falling. Even if public opinion hates the chaebol, being able to work in chaebol companies is still a dream for many young Koreans.