On June 18th, (Finance Association Society, reporter: Xiao Lianghua), ST Baan has closed at a price below 1 yuan for 19 consecutive trading days as of June 17th. On June 18th, whether the company's stock price can close at or above 1 yuan is a matter of life and death for ST Baan.

On the same day, 25,400 shareholders of ST Baan (data as of May 11th) saw hope several times, and the company's stock price touched 0.97, 0.98, and 0.99 yuan, but it always fell short of the maintenance line of 1 yuan. By the end of the day, the company's stock price experienced a sudden change, with a rapid drop of 20%, closing at 0.68 yuan/share, becoming another company with a “1-yuan delisting”. Tonight, the company announced that it has triggered the mandatory delisting from trading and will terminate the listing without entering a delisting period.

Looking back at ST Baan's recent performance, the company is under great pressure to delist, with internal disputes among shareholders, auditors issuing a “disclaimer of opinion” on the financial report, the collapse of the main business, and even the delay in replying to exchange inquiries about the annual report. ST Baan, with its many ills, is difficult to extricate itself from the predicament, and its various statements and actions are seen by some investors as a ploy to lure individual investors to enter the game. Exchange data shows that in the recent volatility of ST Baan's stock price, only retail investors have been net buyers, while large investors and institutional investors have been net sellers.

*ST Baan investors are struggling with a 1 cent stock price.

For ST Baan's investors, the performance of the company's stock price on the 18th is worrying.

From the opening until around 2:00 PM, the company's stock price remained in a state of high opening and volatility, and approached the 1 yuan mark several times. The highest point during trading was 0.99 yuan, with an increase of more than 15%. However, in the half-hour before the close, there was a “sudden change in the situation,” and a large number of chips were sold, causing the company's stock price to collapse instantly, ultimately closing at a 20% limit-down at 0.68 yuan/share. The stock price fluctuated by 36.47%, with a turnover rate of 19.95%, and a turnover of 117 million yuan for the day.

Investors in the company's stock bar cried out: They thought ST Baan was about to maintain the stock price, so they chased after it in the morning and bought at a high price, resulting in a loss of 34% by the end of the day.

From the disclosed data on the list of most actively traded stocks after market close, three of the top five buyers were Lhasa branches of East Money Information, and two of the top five sellers were Lhasa branches of East Money Information, which are recognized as the retail investor headquarters. Previously, on **** and 11th, the exchange twice disclosed the trading statistics during ST Baan's abnormal period, during which only retail investors were net buyers, and large investors and institutional investors were net sellers. Over the past 20 trading days, ST Baan's closing price on May 21st, 24th and June 11th were 0.99, 0.98, and 0.97 yuan, respectively, only one step away from the 1-yuan red line, tempting individual investors to participate in the game.

The disillusionment of "fantasy safeguarding"

In May, the company stated on the investor interaction platform that it will proactively communicate with relevant local departments and recover project engineering funds as early as possible, seize opportunities in the coal-fired power and pumped storage energy storage industries, not abandon R&D investment in new products, and expand new markets.

On May 13th, after the company's stock price had been below 1 yuan for two consecutive trading days, ST Baan announced that Chairman Zhang Huagen plans to increase his holdings of the company's shares through centralized competitive bidding within six months, with the amount of shareholding increasing no less than 5 million yuan, and no more than 10 million yuan.

On May 17th, ST Baan released a letter to all Baan shareholders on its official WeChat account, stating that the company had made significant progress operationally and in production in 2023. By 2024, the company's management, sales, and R&D teams were actively involved in their work.

On June 14th, the company disclosed an announcement of changes in its management team; on June 16th, the media reported that internal disputes among the major shareholders of the company had been resolved, and the new management team would work to help the company out of the crisis.

However, Finance Association Society's reporters found that so far, the company still faces many significant risks that have not yet been resolved. Most of ST Baan's statements and actions are more for show than substance, and it is difficult to change the company's predicament.

Changes in senior management's shareholding show that from May 22nd to June 14th, Zhang Huagen increased his holdings by a total of 2.12 million shares worth less than 2 million yuan. In the two trading days after the announcement of the chairman's shareholding plan, ST Baan's stock price rose by 20% and 12%, respectively. There was even a situation where the closing price had been above 1 yuan/share for five consecutive trading days. However, this was short-lived and since May 21st, the company's stock price has fallen back below 1 yuan and has not created any more miracles.

However, this was short-lived and since May 21st, the company's stock price has fallen back below 1 yuan and has not created any more miracles.

Within reach? Out of reach?

From ST Baan's current situation, it seems that maintaining the stock price is a task that is destined to be difficult to achieve.

The company has been plagued by shareholder infighting for a long time. Main entities like shanghai hongxiang smart technology co., ltd. and shanghai maiye smart technology co., ltd., which are related to the second largest shareholder shandong gaocreate, have filed lawsuits against the company, involving billions of yuan. And these entities have applied for compulsory enforcement against the company.

In addition, in 2023 annual report of ST Ba’an, the auditing firm issued an audit report with an 'unable to express opinion' opinion, which includes a paragraph on significant uncertainty regarding the continued operations.

In the audit report, the accountant clearly pointed out that the company has been incurring heavy losses for many years, with a large amount of debt default and litigation, multiple bank accounts being frozen, and most of the properties being seized. It is uncertain whether various coping measures formulated by the management can be implemented. The accounting firm is unable to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence related to the company's ability to continue as a going concern, to determine whether the financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework assuming the company will continue as a going concern.

For this reason, the company has had heated arguments with the accounting firm, accusing them of being 'unprofessional'.

In terms of operation, the company has been losing money for three consecutive years, with a total loss of about 1.8 billion yuan. This situation has not improved in the first quarter of 2024. Furthermore, the company's revenue has been less than 300 million yuan for the past three years. Without improvement in its main business, according to the latest delisting rules, the company faces a risk of delisting based on financial indicators.

At the same time, financial data shows that as of the end of the first quarter of this year, the net assets per share of ST Ba’an is only 0.11 yuan, and the asset-liability ratio is as high as 100.52%.

On the other hand, the original controlling shareholder of ST Ba’an, Zhang Chunlin, has been continuously reducing his shareholding in recent years and cashing it out. As of the end of the first quarter of this year, his shareholding ratio has fallen to 17.48%, while at the beginning of the company's listing, his shareholding ratio exceeded 50%.

Some investors have expressed that with shareholder infighting, the burden of the major shareholder's debt, continued losses in the main business, and limited amount of management's shareholding, it is very difficult for ST Ba'an to keep afloat. For many small and medium investors, it seems like it is possible to avoid the red line of 1 yuan per share in this situation, but in reality it is very difficult to achieve.