Guide reading

Human is the basic element and driving force of economic and social development. Due to the long-term implementation of the family planning policyChina's population crisis is approachingThe economic and social problems are becoming more and more serious.In recent years, the number of people born has been greatly reduced, the desire to have children has been greatly reduced, the scale of women of childbearing age has peaked and the aging of the population has accelerated.

2018The number of people born per year has dropped to 15.23 million, the comprehensive two-child policy has been lower than expected, and the effect of fertility accumulation has receded.The number of people born in 2018 was 15.23 million, down 2 million from 2017 and the lowest since 1949 except during natural disasters in 1960-1961. The birth rate fell to 10.94 per thousand in 2018, the lowest since 1949, and the total fertility rate fell to 1.52, or an average of 1.52 children per woman of childbearing age. Since the implementation of the "comprehensive two-child" policy in 2016, the number of people born has climbed to 17.86 million in 2016, and then declined for two consecutive years.

We appeal that we should immediately and fully liberalize and encourage childbearing, so that more people want to live and dare to have children.

Abstract

China's 70-year fertility policy and the evolution of the situation: the population crisis is approaching.

1) the evolution of fertility policy: from family autonomy to government planning, from encouragement to strict control to relaxation.Since 1949, the fertility policy has mainly experienced four stages of change: first, the stage of encouraging fertility from 1949 to 1953: restricting birth control and induced abortion. The second is the loose family planning stage from 1954 to 1977: from birth control to "late scarcity" policy. The third is the strict family planning stage from 1978 to 2013: the one-child policy, the "one-and-a-half-child" policy and the "two-and-a-half-child" policy. Fourth, the family planning stage has been relaxed since 2014: from "single second child" to "comprehensive second child".

2) the evolution of fertility: the fertility rate is in the doldrums, the overall second-child effect is fading, and the number of births is about to decline sharply.There have been three rounds of baby boomers in China since 1949, with the total fertility rate falling from about 6 before the 1970s to about 2 in 1990 and then to about 1.5 after 2010. The fourth round of baby boomers failed to appear because of long-term strict family planning. The comprehensive two-child policy in 2016 was less than expected, and the effect of birth accumulation has receded, with the number of births falling to 15.23 million in 2018, a decrease of 2 million and 12 percent compared with 2017. The scale of women of childbearing age has peaked and declined. In 2030, the size of the main women of childbearing age between 20 and 35 will be 29% lower than that in 2018, of which the number of women aged 25-30 during the peak childbearing period will decrease by 41%. The number of births is about to decline sharply and is expected to fall to more than 11 million in 2030, 26% less than in 2018. China's fertility rate is falling at an unprecedented rate, not only well below the global average of 2.45, but also below the level of 1.67 in developed countries.

3) the impact of low fertility rate: the labor force shrinks, the aging accelerates, the population is about to peak, the demographic dividend disappears, and the problem of leftover men is serious.In terms of labor force, the working-age population aged 15-64 peaked in 2010, the demographic dividend disappeared, and China "gets old before getting rich". It is estimated that the working-age population of 15-64 years old will be significantly reduced by 24% in 2050 compared with 2018. From the perspective of aging, the median age of China's population has risen rapidly from 22 in 1980 to 37 in 2015, and is expected to rise to 43 in 2030. The proportion of elderly people in China will rise rapidly from 12% to 30% in 2018-2050. By that time, there will be one elderly person over the age of 65 for every 3.3Chinese, and the pension burden will be increasing day by day, and the pension in some provinces such as Heilongjiang will not be able to make ends meet. In terms of total population, China's population will peak around 2024-2031, depending on the strength of future fertility policies. China's global population may fall from 19 per cent to 7 per cent in 2015-2100. From the perspective of leftover men, the sex ratio at birth began to be out of balance gradually in 1982, especially during the period from 1990 to 2010. The problem of "leftover men" has become increasingly prominent, exceeding 20 million in 2015 and about 40 million by 2040. In addition, the number of families who have lost their only families has reached one million.

Why didn't you give birth? -- weakening the basis of fertility and restricting the cost of childbearing

1) Fertility theory: from the decline of mortality rate to the decline of utilitarian reproductive desire, and then to cost constraints.. According to the changes of the dominant factors driving the decline of fertility, human history can be divided into four stages: first, the stage driven by high mortality, in which people need to counteract high mortality with high fertility in order to maximize profits, and the total fertility rate is more than 6. Second, in the stage driven by the decline in mortality, low fertility can also ensure maximum benefits, and the total fertility rate is reduced from more than 6 to about 3. Third, in the decline stage of utilitarian fertility, people's reproductive behavior is closer to emotional needs, and pay attention to the improvement of the quality of their children, and the total fertility rate is roughly reduced from 3 to about 2. Fourth, in the low fertility stage with cost constraints, the total fertility rate falls below the replacement level 2, which is lower than the desired fertility level.

2) late marriage and late childbearing, single dink, infertility and so on weaken the reproductive foundation.The marriage rate in China peaked in 2013, and the divorce rate continued to rise. The phenomenon of late marriage and late childbearing has become increasingly prominent. From 1990 to 2015, the average age of first birth has been postponed from 24.1 years to 26.3 years, and the main age of first birth has been postponed from 20-27 years to 22-29 years. Due to matching problems in the marriage market and celibacy, the size of "leftover women" has rapidly increased to about 6 million, and the higher the education, the greater the probability of "leftover". In addition, the increase in dink families and the number of infertile people weakens the fertility base.

3) the direct cost, old-age burden and opportunity cost of housing, education and health care are high to restrain childbearing behavior.House prices have risen rapidly, with the mortgage-to-income ratio rising from 17 per cent to 44 per cent in 2004-2017; the cost of education has risen significantly, especially the serious shortage of public kindergartens. The proportion of students attending public kindergartens in China fell from 95 per cent to 44 per cent in 1997-2017. Medical expenses continued to rise, and residents' health care expenditure increased by 22.4 times from 1995 to 2017. The burden of providing for the aged in the "421" family structure has severely squeezed the desire to have children. The rate of female labor participation is high, but the protection of employment rights and interests is not enough, which leads to high opportunity cost of childbearing.

International experience: what is the effect of encouraging childbirth?

1) OECD experience: which is the most effective way to encourage childbearing?The policy system of encouraging fertility in OECD countries mainly coversGuaranteed leave, financial subsidies, child care services, women's employment supportWait for four aspects. Among them, the correlation between vacation length and fertility level is weak, which is due to the contradiction between extending women's vacation time and protecting their employment rights and interests. The proportion of family welfare expenditure is related to fertility level to a certain extent. In 2013, the average ratio of family welfare expenditure to GDP in OECD countries was about 2.4%. The enrollment rate is related to the fertility level to a certain extent. The higher the enrollment rate is, the higher the fertility level is. The average enrollment rate of OECD countries aged 0-2 years is 34.2%. The protection of women's employment rights and interests is related to the fertility level to a certain extent, the smaller the employment gap between men and women, the higher the fertility level.

2) France: actively promote the balance between family and work, and the total fertility rate is close to 2.France began to encourage childbearing long before World War II.Achieve a balance between work and family by improving a meticulous allowance system, diversified child care services and creating a family-friendly corporate atmosphere.The total fertility rate reached 1.96 in 2016. In 2013, French household welfare expenditure accounted for 3.7% of GDP, ranking third among OECD countries; in 2014, the enrollment rate of 0-2 years old reached 51.9%, much higher than the OECD level. Big French companies work together to create a family-friendly corporate atmosphere, with a gap of less than 10 per cent between male and female labour force participation; in addition, immigrants, who account for about 9 per cent, have also played a role in the rebound in France's fertility rate.

3) Japan: the traditional gender division of labor intensifies the contradiction between work and family, the total fertility rate stays at about 1.4, and the population situation is grim.Japan once controlled its population before the 1970s and began to encourage fertility in the 1990s, but the total fertility rate remained at 1.4 in 2016. The low fertility rate caused Japan's population to peak in 2008 and will be 53% lower than its peak in 2100. And the degree of aging is the highest in the world. The reason is: on the one hand, Japan missed the best time to adjust its fertility policy. Second, Japan is weak in encouraging childbirth, accounting for only 1.5% of family welfare expenditure, ranking last among OECD countries. Third, the gender division of labor between men and women in Japan is relatively common, and gender discrimination in the workplace is serious. More and more Japanese women give up marriage and have children. From 1990 to 2015, the lifetime fianc é rate of women over the age of 50 surged from 4.3% to 14.6%.

Policy suggestion: we should immediately liberalize and encourage childbirth.

1) abandon the concept that population is a burden, be more people-oriented, and speed up the promotion of long-term and balanced population development.Population is an important support and symbol of a country's national strength. People are the basic elements and driving force of development, and all economic and social development is for people.

2) immediately and fully liberalize childbearing and let the reproductive right return to the family."immediately" is due to the urgent demographic situation, which is currently in the fertility window for people born in the middle and later stages of the third baby boom. With full liberalization, people who originally did not want to have children will not be born, but some people who want to have three children can, so they do not have to worry that a large number of births will lead to a surge in births in some groups and in some areas.

3) accelerate the construction of fertility support system.One is to implement a differentiated personal income tax deduction and economic subsidy policy, covering health care from pregnancy to the age of 18 or the end of academic education. The second is to increase the supply of child care services, vigorously increase the enrollment rate of 0-3 years old from the current 4% to 40%, and give economic encouragement to intergenerational care. The third is to further improve the protection of women's employment rights and interests, and implement fertility tax incentives for enterprises, and speed up the construction of a reasonable and effective mechanism for sharing fertility costs among the state, enterprises and families. Fourth, we should strengthen the protection of equal rights to give birth out of wedlock. Fifth, increase investment in education and health care, maintain long-term stability of housing prices, and reduce the direct cost of raising.

Catalogue

1 China's 70-year fertility policy and its evolution: the population crisis is approaching

1.1 Evolution of fertility policy: from family autonomy to government planning, from encouragement to strict control to relaxation

1.2 Evolution of fertility: the fertility rate is in the doldrums, the overall second-child effect is fading, and the number of births is about to decline sharply.

1.3 impact: the labor force is shrinking, the aging is accelerating, the population is about to peak, the demographic dividend disappears, and the problem of leftover men is serious.

Why didn't you give birth? -- weakening the basis of fertility and restricting the cost of childbearing

2.1 Fertility Theory: from the decline of Mortality rate to the decline of utilitarian Fertility desire, and then to cost constraint

2.2 late marriage and late childbearing, single dink, infertility, etc. weaken the basis of fertility.

2.3 Housing, education, health care and other direct costs, heavy pension burden and high opportunity cost inhibit childbearing behavior.

3 International experience: what is the effect of encouraging childbirth?

3.1 OECD experience: what is the most effective way to encourage childbearing?

3.2 France: actively promoting a balance between family and work, with a total fertility rate close to 2

3.3 Japan: the traditional gender division of labor intensifies the contradiction between work and family, the total fertility rate stays around 1.4, and the population situation is grim.

4 Policy recommendations: immediately and fully liberalize and encourage childbirth

4.1 abandon the concept that population is a burden, be more people-oriented, and speed up the promotion of long-term and balanced population development

4.2 Fertility should be liberalized immediately and fully, so that reproductive rights can be returned to the family.

4.3 accelerate the construction of a fertility support system and vigorously encourage fertility

Text

1 China's 70-year fertility policy and its evolution: the population crisis is approaching

1.1 Evolution of fertility policy: from family autonomy to government planning, from encouragement to strict control to relaxation

Since 1949, China's fertility policy has gone through four stages:The first is the stage of encouraging childbearing from 1949 to 1953: restricting birth control and induced abortion.Mao Zedong said in August 1949 that "of all things in the world, man is the first to be precious." Under the leadership of GCD, as long as there are people, any human miracle can be created. " In April 1950, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Health of the Central military Commission jointly issued measures to prohibit illegal abortion. In December 1952, the Ministry of Health issued the interim measures for restricting birth Control and induced abortion. In January 1953, the Ministry of Health informed the Customs to ban the import of contraceptive and appliances for inspection.

The second is the loose family planning stage from 1954 to 1977: from birth control to "late scarcity" policy.The first census in 1953 found that the national population was 602 million, which greatly exceeded the government's expectations. at the same time, the lagging effect of population explosion was gradually reflected, and the birth control policy was gradually put forward. In March 1955, the CPC Central Committee proposed that "birth control is a major policy issue related to the lives of the broad masses of people." In September 1956, Zhou Enlai reiterated the policy of "advocating birth control" at the eighth CPC National Congress. In February 1957, Mao Zedong proposed at the Supreme Council of State that "human beings should control themselves and achieve planned growth." The Great Leap forward movement in 1958 made the view of "more people and more power" become the mainstream, and Ma Yinchu's "new population theory", which proposed to control the population, was criticized. With the failure of the Great Leap forward and the impact of natural disasters, China entered a three-year difficult period from 1959 to 1961, and the birth control policy was put forward again. In December 1962, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the directive on seriously promoting family planning, and in January 1966, the CPC Central Committee issued the directive on family planning. But then the Cultural Revolution began, and family planning work was hit.

In July 1971, the State Council demanded that "the natural population growth rate should be reduced year by year during the fourth five-year Plan period, and strive to drop to about 10 per thousand in cities and below 15 per thousand in rural areas in 1975." In the formulation of the fourth five-year Plan that year, it was put forward that "one is not less, two are just right, and three are too many." The policy of "late, rare and few" was put forward at the first national family planning work report meeting in December 1973. "late" means that men get married after the age of 25, women marry after the age of 23, and women give birth after the age of 24; "sparse" refers to an interval of more than three years; and "less" refers to a couple having no more than two children.

The third is the strict family planning stage from 1978 to 2013: the one-child policy, the "one-and-a-half-child" policy and the "two-child" policy, which was vetoed by one vote.Since the beginning of reform and opening up at the end of 1978, most areas of economy and society have shifted from government planning to market regulation, but reproductive rights have been further centrally managed by the government from the family. In March 1978, "the state promotes and promotes family planning" was written into the Constitution for the first time. In October 1978, the Central Committee made it clear that "it is recommended that a couple should have one and two children at most." In February 1980, Xinhua News Agency released the Centennial Forecast of China's population, which said that if the fertility trend remained unchanged, China's population would reach 4 billion by 2050, causing a shock. In September 1980, the CPC Central Committee issued an open letter to all GCD members of the Communist Youth League on the issue of controlling population growth in China, requiring each couple to have only one child. Since then, the "one-child policy", which aims to control the fertility rate of a generation, has been launched and implemented throughout the country. In September 1982, the national policy on family planning was included in the report of the 12th CPC National Congress and implemented in the Constitution in December of the same year, that is, "the state promotes family planning." to make population growth in line with economic and social development plans "and" both husband and wife have the obligation to implement family planning. " At that time, Changde City, Hunan Province took the lead in the implementation of the "family planning one-vote veto system", and then it was implemented throughout the country.

Due to great resistance, in April 1984, the CPC Central Committee appropriately "opened small mouths and blocked big ones" in some rural areas, and the rural areas of 19 provinces across the country were gradually adjusted to the "one-and-a-half-child policy", that is, the first birth of a girl can have a child. The population and Family Planning Law, adopted at the end of 2001 and implemented in September 2002, stipulates that if both parties are only children and have given birth to one child, they may have a second child. Various localities have formulated the "two-child" policy according to the law, which has been implemented in Henan in 2011 and the latest in the country. According to Cai Fang (2018) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, before 2010, the one-child policy covered 35.9% of the country's total population, the one-and-a-half-child policy covered 52.9%, the two-child policy covered 9.6%, and the policy of three children and above covered 1.6%.

Fourth, the family planning stage has been relaxed since 2014: from "single second child" to "comprehensive second child".In 2013, the Ministry of Health and the National Family Planning Commission merged into the National Health and Family Planning Commission, and in November of the same year, the third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee decided to launch the policy of "only one child and two children." Due to the ineffective implementation of the "comprehensive two-child" policy in 2016, the population and Family Planning Law was revised to "the state encourages a couple to have two children." In 2018, the National Health and Family Planning Commission will no longer be retained and the National Health Commission will be established. this is the first time that the name "family planning" has not been found in the constituent departments of the State Council since the establishment of the National Family Planning Commission in 1981.

1.2 Evolution of fertility: the fertility rate is in the doldrums, the overall second-child effect is fading, and the number of births is about to decline sharply.

1There have been three rounds of baby boomers in China since 1949, with the total fertility rate falling from about 6 before the 1970s to about 2 in 1990 and then to about 1.5 after 2010, while the fourth round of baby boomers failed to occur as scheduled due to long-term strict family planning.The total fertility rate refers to the average number of children per woman in her lifetime, but the omission of the younger population in official data has led to an underestimation of the total fertility rate. We have revised the total fertility rate in recent years based on primary school enrollment data and missing reporting rates in the education sector.The first round of baby boomFrom 1950 to 1958, due to the stability of people's lives, the recovery and development of economy and the improvement of medical and health conditions after the founding of the people's Republic of China, the average annual number of births was 21 million, with a peak of nearly 23 million (1954). The birth rate was basically over 30 per thousand, with an average total fertility rate of 5.3. During the three difficult years from 1959 to 1961, the number of people born, the birth rate and the total fertility rate all declined significantly.The second round of baby boomIt appeared in 1962-1975, with an average annual birth rate of 26.28 million, with a peak of more than 30 million (1963). Among them, there are not only the compensatory fertility factors after the three-year difficult period, but also related to the impact on family planning work during the Cultural Revolution. However, under the "late scarcity" policy in the 1970s, the number of people born in 1970-1977 fell from 1970 to 17.89 million, the birth rate from 33 per thousand to 19 per thousand, and the total fertility rate from 5.8to 2.8in 1980.The third round of baby boomIt appeared in 1981-1991, with an average annual birth rate of 22.6 million, a peak of 25.5 million (1987), a birth rate of about 20 ‰-23 ‰, and an average total fertility rate of 2.3. Since then, the number of births has gradually dropped to about 16 million in 2003, and the official total fertility rate has dropped to about 1.4 and revised to about 1.6.The fourth round of baby boomIt should appear after 2010, but disappeared due to the long-term strict implementation of family planning, with the official total fertility rate falling to 1.18 in 2010, compared with 1.5 after revision.

The comprehensive two-child policy was less than expected, and the effect of birth accumulation has receded, with the number of births falling to 15.23 million in 2018, or about 12 per cent.Both the "single two-child" and "comprehensive two-child" policies have failed to reverse the depressed fertility trend.After the release of the "only two children" in 2014, the number of people born was 16.87 million, an increase of less than 500000 over 2013. After the release of the "full second child" in 2016, the number of people born climbed to 17.86 million, the highest level since 2000, but fell to 17.23 million in 2017. From the point of view of the number of births per child, the total fertility rate of the second child has rebounded significantly since 2014, mainly due to the concentrated release of the strong desire to have a second child after 75, but the decline in the fertility rate of one child and the decline in the scale of women of childbearing age year by year indicate that the number of people born will decline sharply. From 2013 to 2017, the total fertility rate of the second child rebounded significantly, with the proportion of the second child born rising from 31.1% to 51.3%. However, the total fertility rate of one child has declined overall, with the proportion of births falling sharply from 64.3% to 42.0%. The marked decline in the total fertility rate of one child means that many young people are unwilling to have one child, and without one child, there will be no second child. In 2018, the number of people born in China decreased by 2 million, or about 12 percent, compared with 2017, and the total fertility rate dropped to 1.52.

The scale of women of childbearing age has peaked and declined. In 2030, the size of women of childbearing age, the main force of childbearing age, will be 29% lower than that in 2018. Among them, the number of women at the peak of childbearing age between 20 and 35 will decrease by 41%. The number of subsequent births is expected to drop to more than 11 million in 2030, 26% less than in 2018.After correcting the omission of the underage population in the census data, we estimate the situation of women of childbearing age from 1982 to 2030. The size of Chinese women of childbearing age between 15 and 49 years old was 250 million in 1982, reached a peak of 380 million in 2011, dropped to 350 million in 2018, and is expected to drop to 300 million by 2030. Among them, the main women of childbearing age between 20 and 35 years old increased from about 120 million in 1982 to a peak of 190 million in 1997, dropped to nearly 160 million in 2018, and is expected to drop to 110 million by 2030; and about 70 million women aged between 25 and 30 are expected to fall to about 41 million by 2030, a decrease of about 41 per cent. In this context, the number of births is expected to fall to more than 11 million in 2030.

2China's fertility rate is falling at an unprecedented rate, not only well below the global average of 2.45, but also below the level of 1.67 in developed countries.Between 1950 and 2015, the total fertility rate fell from 3.3 to 1.9 in the United States, from 3 to 1.4 in Japan and from 5.9 to 2.4 in India, both of which were much smaller than China's total fertility rate from 6 to 1.6, according to the United Nations. China's total fertility rate was 1.62 in 2016, the lowest in the world, well below not only the global average of 2.45, but also the level of 1.67 high-income economies. Compared with Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, Russia and other countries with similar per capita GDP, China's total fertility rate is still on the low side.

1.3 impact: the labor force is shrinking, the aging is accelerating, the population is about to peak, the demographic dividend disappears, and the problem of leftover men is serious.

1The size of the labour force continues to shrink and will be 24 per cent smaller in 2050 than in 2018.After the reform and opening up in 1978, China has rapidly grown into the world's second largest economy by relying on a large and young labor force and the huge market associated with it. The second round of baby boomers from 1962 to 1975 was the main force in the construction of the 40 years of reform and opening up, with more production and savings and less consumption, resulting in an increase in savings and investment rates, and a trade surplus in excess of investment. at the same time, the improvement of excess liquidity and per capita income promotes the upgrading of consumption, and the potential economic growth rate is higher. In the context of a long-term low fertility rate, the proportion and size of China's working-age population aged 15-64 peaked in 2010 and 2013, respectively.The proportion of working-age people in Japan, the US and the UK peaked in 1991, 2009 and 2013, respectively, when per capita income was much higher than in China.China's working-age population fell to about 990 million in 2018, and China's total employment fell for the first time. According to the current trend, China's working-age population will decrease by another 240 million to 750 million, or about 24%, by 2050 compared with 2018.According to the 2010 census data, the population of post-80s, post-90s and post-00s is 219 million, 188 million and 147 million respectively. The post-90s is about 31 million less than the post-80s, and the post-90s is 41 million less than the post-90s. As the total labor supply continues to shrink, labor costs will rise day by day, and some manufacturing industries have begun and will continue to migrate to Southeast Asia, India and other places. From a marginal point of view, China's demographic dividend is over, facing the situation of "getting old before getting rich". In the future, the savings rate and investment rate will gradually decline, the consumption rate will gradually rise, and the potential economic growth rate will decline. At the absolute level, at presentThe total dependency ratio of China's population is about 40%, and it will still be in the "population opportunity window" (less than 50%) with relatively light population burden for some time in the future.

2The aging of the population is accelerating, the burden of providing for the aged is increasing day by day, and the proportion of China's elderly will rise rapidly from 12% to 30% in 2018-2050.Aging is a common phenomenon in the world, but the speed of aging in China is unprecedented because of family planning. The median age of China's population rose rapidly from 19.3 to 37.0 from 1970 to 2015, and is expected to reach 50 by 2050. From an international point of view, the median age of the United States, Europe, Japan and India in 2015 was 37.6, 41.6, 46.3 and 26.7 years respectively, and will be 42.0, 46.6, 53.2 and 37.5 years by 2050. It took 126 years in France, 46 years in the UK, 40 years in Germany and 25 years in Japan (1970-1994). It took 36 years for Germany (1972-2008) and 21 years for Japan (1995-2006). China's population aged 65 and above accounted for more than 7% in 2001 and entered an aging society, accounting for 11.9% in 2018. It is expected that China will enter a deeply aging society in about 22 years, that is, around 2023. 10 years later, around 2033, China will enter a super-aging society, reaching 30% in 2050, an unprecedented pace of aging. Moreover, due to the large population base, the size of the elderly population is also unprecedented. In 2018, the number of people aged 65 and over in China has reached nearly 170 million, and it is estimated that it will reach 390 million in 2050. By that time, there will be one elderly person over the age of 65 for every 3.3 Chinese.

China will gradually become one of the countries with the heaviest pension burden in the world, seriously dragging down the national finance and restricting the economic vitality.. According to the basic old-age insurance fund for urban workers, the payable time of China's cumulative balance has gradually decreased from 18.5 months in 2012 to 13.8 months in 2017, and the pension dependency ratio (active / retired) has dropped to 2.65. In 2017, six provinces were unable to make ends meet, the cumulative balance of 15 provinces can be paid for less than 10 months, and the pension dependency ratio of 7 provinces has dropped to less than 2. Among them, the Heilongjiang old-age insurance fund has been "living beyond its means" since 2013, and its cumulative balance turned negative in 2016. Moreover, as the aging intensifies, the pressure on medical expenditure will become greater and greater. According to the National Health Service Survey, the two-week prevalence rate of residents in the surveyed areas of China from 2003 to 2013 increased from 14.3% to 24.1%. Among them, the number of people aged 65 and over increased from 33.8% to 62.2%, and the prevalence rate of the elderly population in 2013 was 2.58 times the average.

3With the population peak approaching, China's population will shrink sharply in the long term, and China's share of the global population will fall from 19 per cent to 7 per cent in 2015-2100.The United Nations has nine plans for predicting the size of China's population, among which the non-change plan and the fixed fertility rate plan both assume a total fertility rate of 1.60 in the future, which is relatively close to the reality, and will reach a peak of 1.42 billion and 1.43 billion in 2023 and 2026 respectively. According to our forecast, according to the current development trend of the total fertility rate of about 1.5, China's population will peak around 2024, and the population will shrink slowly in the first 25-30 years after reaching the peak, but as the number of people born in the high fertility period enters the end of life, the rate of contraction will be significantly faster. China's population will be reduced by only 8% in 2050 compared with 2024, 21% in 2075 compared with 2050, and 23% in 2100 compared with 2075, that is, to about 800 million. China, which accounted for 22 per cent of the world's population in 1950, fell slightly to about 19 per cent in 2015 and will drop sharply to about 7 per cent in 2100. If we look forward to the year 2200, China's population will fall to only about 200 million, and the proportion of China's population in the world will continue to decline. As the total population shrinks, China's big market advantage will gradually lose, and its overall national strength will also be affected.

4The sex ratio at birth has been seriously out of balance since the 1980s, and the problem of "leftover men" has become increasingly prominent. The gender imbalance between post-90s and post-00s is very serious, and the sex ratio at birth was once more than 120.. The sex ratio at birth in China was 107.6 in 1982, more than 110in 1990 and close to 118in 2000. since then, it has continued to decline since 2008 and has dropped to 111.9 in 2017. According to the 2010 census data, the post-00s gender Prida 119, men are nearly 13 million more than women; post-90s men and women Prida 110, men are nearly 9 million more than women. The sex ratio of post-80s and post-70s unmarried people was 137 and 308 respectively.The number of unmarried men aged 30 and over in China exceeded 20 million in 2015 and is expected to exceed 40 million by 2040.. The number of unmarried men aged 30 and over in China was just over 10 million in 1990, 16 million in 2000 and 20 million in 2015.From the distribution of urban and rural areasThe problem of "leftover men" in rural areas is more serious than in cities and established towns. in 2015, the unmarried rate of men over 30 in rural areas was 5.7%, more than 4.3% in cities and 3.6% in established towns.In terms of education levelThe unmarried rate of men who did not go to school was as high as 15%, followed by men with postgraduate degrees who delayed entering the marriage market because of further studies, with an unmarried rate as high as 9%. As the population with high sex ratio has gradually entered the marriage age since 1990, the problem of "leftover men" is expected to become more prominent in the future, reaching about 40 million by 2040. The marriage squeeze problem of "personal distress" may evolve into a population security issue of "public issues", including women's trading, sexual harassment, sexual crimes and so on.

5The number of families who have lost their only family has reached one million.The death of the only child may make the whole family face collapse, and the family functions and social functions such as upbringing, support, economy, education and so on will gradually weaken or even disappear. Relevant research shows that at present, China has accumulated more than 1 million, and the number of "single families" has increased by 76000 every year, in addition to a relatively large number of "disabled single families".

Why didn't you give birth? -- weakening the basis of fertility and restricting the cost of childbearing

2.1 Fertility Theory: from the decline of Mortality rate to the decline of utilitarian Fertility desire, and then to cost constraint

According to the changes of the dominant factors driving the decline of fertility, human history can be divided into four stages.：1) in the high mortality-driven stage, people need to counteract high mortality with high fertility, and the total fertility rate is more than 6.In the period of agricultural civilization, the direct cost of giving birth to children is very low, the leisure time of agricultural production is more, and the opportunity cost is low. Moreover, the labor-intensive agricultural production mode determines that the expected economic benefits of giving birth to children are high, farmers can only rely on raising children to prevent old age, and family status is also closely related to the prosperity of the population. Factors such as backward public health conditions and frequent wars lead to mortality as high as 20 ‰ or more than 30 ‰, which makes people have to contend with high mortality with high fertility.2) in the stage driven by the decline in mortality, it is recognized that low fertility can also maximize benefits, and the total fertility rate is reduced from more than 6 to about 3.With the significant improvement in public health conditions and medical technology, the mortality rate continues to decline significantly, human beings no longer need to combat high mortality with high fertility, and fertility is declining with the progress of contraceptive and birth control technology. From international experience, most of this natural transformation has a lag of 15-25 years. From 1950 to 1970, the mortality rate in China decreased from about 20 per thousand to 8 per thousand, and from 1970 to 1978, the total fertility rate in China decreased from 5.8 to 2.7.3) in the decline stage of utilitarian fertility, people's reproductive behavior is closer to emotional needs, and pay attention to the improvement of the quality of their children, and the total fertility rate is roughly reduced from 3 to about 2.As the mortality rate has dropped to a low level, the dominant factor affecting reproductive behavior has changed to the problem of income. With the development of economic and social modernization, the direct cost of giving birth to children rises, especially after the general improvement of education and women's more participation in employment, the opportunity cost of having children increases; in terms of income, spiritual benefits are basically not related to income, and utilitarian benefits decline, resulting in a decline in the number of desired births. Moreover, rising incomes make families have a greater demand for the quality of their children. This gradually makes the family's fertility behavior away from utilitarianism, close to the emotional needs of a boy and a girl, and the total fertility rate drops to about 2. This transformation in China roughly took place from 1979 to 1990. In addition to the influence of the family planning policy, it also lies in the rapid progress of industrialization and urbanization after the reform and opening up, the development of township enterprises and a large number of rural people moving to cities to work.4) in the low fertility stage with cost constraints, the total fertility rate falls below the replacement level 2, which is lower than the desired fertility level.. In modern society, the further decline in fertility rate is not due to the decrease in the number of willingness to have children, but mainly due to the increase in cost that people's desire to have children can not be fully realized. The gap between the actual fertility level and the desired fertility level is determined by the cost.

2.2 late marriage and late childbearing, single dink, infertility, etc. weaken the basis of fertility.

1The marriage rate in China has continued to decline since it peaked in 1990, and the divorce rate has continued to rise; the phenomenon of late marriage and late childbearing has become increasingly prominent, and the average age of first childbearing has been postponed from 24.1 years to 26.3 years from 2013 to 2015.Unlike 40% of children born out of wedlock in the United States and Europe, 60% of children born out of wedlock account for less than 10% in China, so the fertility problem in China is marriage in the first place. The number of marriage registration pairs in China reached 13.47 million in 2013, and then continued to decline to 10.63 million in 2017, with the rough marriage rate falling from 9.9 per thousand to 7.7 per thousand. The number of divorce registration pairs climbed from less than 1 million before 1995 to 4.37 million in 2017, and the crude divorce rate climbed to 3.2 per thousand. From 1990 to 2010, the average age of first marriage of men was postponed from 23.6years to 25.9years, and that of women was postponed from 22.0years to 23.9years. Among them, the average age of first marriage of women and men exceeded the age of late marriage in 1996 and 1998 respectively. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the proportion of marriages registered between 20 and 24 years old (including remarriage) dropped from 470% to 24.2% in 2005-2016. The proportion of people aged 25-29, 30-34 and over 35 years old increased from 34.3%, 9.9% and 8.8% to 38.2%, 12.8% and 24.8%, respectively.

The phenomenon of late childbearing has become increasingly prominent. From 1990 to 2015, the average first childbearing age of women was postponed from 24.1 to 26.3 years, and the average childbearing age (all children) was postponed from 24.8 to 28.0 years.In 1990, the main first childbearing age and the main childbearing age were 20-27 years old, and the proportion of one child and the number of children were 86.6% and 74.9%, respectively. By 2015, the main first childbearing age has been postponed to 22-29 years old, and the proportion of one child has dropped to 66.7%; the main childbearing age has been postponed to 23-30 years old, and the proportion of children born has dropped to 59.1%.In addition, from 1990 to 2015, the proportion of one child born to women over the age of 30 increased from 4.2 per cent to nearly 19.2 per cent, and the number of children accounted for 14.0 per cent to 32.3 per cent. According to the 2015 mini-census data, the average age of giving birth to one child, two children, three children and more is 26.3, 29.6 and 32.0 years respectively, and the proportion of births is 72.0%, 73.5% and 69.5%, respectively.

In addition, the number of families choosing dink after marriage is also increasing, especially in the more developed first-and second-tier cities. A survey conducted by the gender and Culture Research Center of Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences in 2003 shows that dink families account for about 10% of registered households in Shenzhen, and are on the rise. According to an article published by Liu Jiaqiang, deputy secretary general of the CPPCC National Committee, in the Learning Times in July 2018, there were 600000 dink families in China in 2010, and the trend continues to increase.

2Due to marriage market matching problems and celibacy, the size of "leftover women" has rapidly increased to about 6 million, and the higher the education level, the greater the probability of "leftover".In the marriage market, women prefer men who are not lower than their own conditions, and men prefer women who are not higher than their own conditions. This means that even if the gender ratio in the marriage market is balanced, the best-off women and the worst-off men are most likely to be left behind. The number of unmarried women aged 30 and over in China was only 460000 in 1990, exceeded 1.54 million in 2000, and climbed to 5.9 million in 2015. Among them, the unmarried rate of women aged 30-34 climbed from 0.6% to 7.0%.From the distribution of urban and rural areasIn 2015, the fiance rate of urban women aged 30 and above was 2.4%, significantly higher than 1.0% in established towns and 0.9% in rural areas.In terms of education levelThe unmarried rate of women with postgraduate degrees aged 30 and above is as high as 11%, which is much higher than 5% of women with bachelor's degree and below.

3The increase in the number of infertile people weakens fertility.The postponement of childbearing age, environmental pollution, bad lifestyle and lack of reproductive health protection lead to an increase in the rate of infertility. The best childbearing age is 25-29 for women and 25-35 for men. Some studies have found that the fertility of 35-year-old women is about 50% of that of 25 years old, and then drops to 50% of 35-year-old women at 40 years old. Reversal of day and night, sitting for a long time, not exercising, long-term use of electronic products, smoking, alcohol abuse, environmental pollution, high-intensity radiation and so on will lead to the decline of male sperm quality. According to a study based on 113000 samples from the third affiliated Hospital of Guangdong Medical University in 2018, male semen quality showed a significant decline from 2005 to 2014. no, no, no.

2.3 Housing, education, health care and other direct costs, heavy pension burden and high opportunity cost inhibit childbearing behavior.

The high direct costs of housing, education and medical care are the "three mountains" to restrain childbearing behavior. "421" institutions have a heavy burden of providing for the aged and squeeze childbearing, and the female labor force participation rate is high, but the protection of employment rights and interests is not enough, resulting in high opportunity costs.

1)House prices are rising rapidly, and the debt pressure of residents is rising rapidly, with the mortgage-to-income ratio rising from 17 per cent to 44 per cent in 2004-2017.Since the housing reform in 1998, house prices have generally risen sharply, which has brought great pressure on families to raise their children and buy houses for their children's marriage. from 1998 to 2018, the average price of newly built commercial housing rose from 1854 yuan per square meter to 8542 yuan. From 2004 to 2017, the balance of personal home purchase loans in China increased from 1.6 trillion yuan to 21.9 trillion yuan, an increase of 13.7 times, accounting for roughly more than 50% of the outstanding loans of residents, compared with 54% in 2017. The mortgage-to-income ratio (personal home purchase loan balance / disposable income) increased from 17% to 44%, driving the household sector debt-to-income ratio (household debt balance / disposable income) from 29% to 80%. In reality, there are still many residents through consumer loans, credit loans and other forms to collect housing purchase funds, the actual mortgage income ratio may be higher.

2The cost of education has risen significantly, especially the serious shortage of public kindergartens. The proportion of students enrolled in public kindergartens in China fell from 95% to 44% in 1997-2017.The current education cost mainly includes kindergarten tuition and fees, kindergarten and primary and secondary school tutoring class fees, university tuition and living expenses and so on. According to the sample statistics of Sina Education's "2017 White Paper on Chinese Family Education consumption", pre-school education accounts for 26% of the family's annual income, compulsory education and high school education account for 21%, and college accounts for 29%.The sharp decline in the supply of public kindergartens and the fact that many families are forced to choose expensive private kindergartens is an important reason for the high cost of preschool education.. In 1997, the number of public kindergartens accounted for 86.5%, and the number of students in public kindergartens accounted for 94.6%. Since 2001, a large number of kindergartens have been pushed into the society, coupled with a large number of primary and secondary schools at the grass-roots level, especially in rural areas, resulting in a substantial reduction of 4,1.5 and 9000 kindergartens in rural areas, counties, towns and cities. From 2001 to 2017, the number of kindergartens nationwide increased from 112000 to 255000, and the number of public kindergartens decreased from 67000 to 48000 in 2010, then rebounded to 95000 in 2017, with the proportion falling from 60.1% to 30.7% and then rising to 37.1%. However, the proportion of public kindergartens has not rebounded, from 83.1% to 44.1%. The proportion of public kindergartens in cities, counties, towns and rural areas dropped from 75.5%, 74.8% and 90.6% to 35.7%, 33.4% and 57.7% in 2016, respectively. In addition, at present, working parents are faced with the problem of transportation of their children in primary and secondary schools. In many places, parents are even required to correct students' homework and explain wrong problems, which gradually evolves into"homework has evolved into parents' homework", "teachers reduce the burden, parents increase the burden"。

3Medical expenses continued to rise, with residents' health care spending rising 22.4 times from 1995 to 2017, far exceeding the 9.2 times increase in disposable income.Due to environmental pollution, increased pressure on work and life and an aging population, the prevalence rate has increased, and medical expenses have continued to rise, affecting family fertility decisions. From 2004 to 2017, the average number of visits of Chinese residents to medical institutions rose from 3.07 to 5.88, and the hospitalization rate rose from 5.1% to 17.6%. According to the 2017 Statistical Bulletin on the Development of China's Health cause, the per capita outpatient expenses of public tertiary hospitals are 306 yuan, the per capita hospitalization expenses are 13088 yuan, and the average daily hospitalization expenses are 1334 yuan. Under this influence, the per capita health care expenditure of residents rose from 62 yuan to 1451 yuan in 1995-2017, an increase of 22.4 times, which is much higher than the increase of 9.2 times per capita disposable income and 8.4 times per capita consumption expenditure. Its share of consumer expenditure rose from 3.2% to 7.9%, including urban from 3.1% to 7.3% and rural areas from 3.2% to 9.7%.

4The "421" family structure of only-child couples has a heavy burden of providing for the aged, squeezing their desire to have children.The families of post-80s and post-90s only children are faced with the "421" family structure, that is, four old people, a couple and a child. According to the estimate of Wang Guangzhou (2013), a demographer of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the size of the only child in China was about 145 million in 2010, and the number increased by more than 4 million per year under the current fertility policy; as a result, the size of the only child in 2018 was about 180 million. Couples who are both only children need to support four elderly people, and if they have a second child, the pressure of life will be even greater, and the heavy burden of providing for the aged will obviously squeeze the desire to have children. If the current fertility situation does not change,As the post-00s generation enters the age of marriage and childbearing and the life expectancy of the elderly is prolonged, some families may even face the family structure of "8421"That is, eight old people, four parents, a couple and a child.

5The rate of female labor participation is high, but the protection of employment rights and interests is not enough, which leads to high opportunity cost of childbearing.According to the International Labour Organization, China's female labor force participation rate (aged 15 and over) fell from 73.2% to 61.5% in 1990-2017, a sharp drop of 11.7 percentage points, but it is still at a high level in the world. In 2017, the global female labor force participation rate was 48.7%, compared with 55.7% in the United States, 51.1% in the European Union, 50.5% in Japan and 27.2% in India. At the same time, although there are many relevant laws and regulations in China to protect women's employment rights and interests, gender discrimination in the workplace is still quite serious. The gap between Chinese women's labor force participation rate and men's from 11.6 percentage points to 14.6 percentage points in 1990-2017, while the gap between men and women's labor force participation rates in the world, the United States, the European Union and Japan all showed a narrowing trend.

3 International experience: what is the effect of encouraging childbirth?

3.1 OECD experience: what is the most effective way to encourage childbearing?

As early as the middle of the 19th century, Britain, Switzerland and other countries began to take measures to protect women's reproductive rights. In 1919, the International Labour Organization issued the three major initiatives of "12-week leave, work protection and income compensation", which established the basic guidelines of fertility policy in OECD countries. The policy frameworks of fertility support in various countries within the OECD are generally similar, but the effects are divided due to different measures and different levels of support.According to the trend of fertility, it can be roughly divided into two categories: first, countries represented by France and Sweden, where the total fertility rate has rebounded to more than 1.8; second, countries represented by Germany and Japan, where the total fertility rate is stagnant at about 1.4.。

The policy system of encouraging childbirth in OECD countries is often based on the establishment of special agencies, which mainly includes four aspects: ensuring leave, increasing economic subsidies, providing child care services, and strengthening women's employment support. Many countries have set up special departments for family affairs, such as the German Ministry of Family Affairs, the elderly, Women and Youth established in Germany in 1995, and Britain set up a special family policy unit in the Ministry of the Interior in 1997. China has established the National Family Planning Commission for population control since 1981, changed to the National Health and Family Planning Commission in 2013 and the National Health Commission in 2018. The main policies to encourage childbirth are as follows:

First, legislate to guarantee leave. Many countries in OECD have 3-5 months maternity leave and 6-35 months parental leave. The average maternity leave is 4.5 months, the average parental leave is 9.2 months, and the average paternity leave is one week.In 2016, 75 per cent of OECD countries have 3-5 months of maternity leave, with an average of 18 weeks; 56 per cent of OECD countries have 6-35 months of parental leave, and 12 countries do not have parental leave, with an average of 37 weeks in OECD countries. Parental leave is generally used after maternity leave for a longer time. There are differences in the salary levels available to women in different countries, which are uniformly adjusted to 100% of their usual salary for horizontal comparison. The average total holiday for women in OECD countries is 30 weeks, of which Estonia and Hungary rank first with a total holiday length of 85 weeks and 72 weeks, while Australia and New Zealand rank at the bottom with 7.6 and 7.7 weeks respectively. China stipulates 14 weeks of maternity leave and no parental leave. In practice, maternity leave is generally set at 18-23 weeks, with 7-30 days of paternity leave for men.

However, the correlation between the length of female leave and the fertility rate is very weak, which is due to the contradiction between the extension of women's vacation time and the protection of their employment rights and interests.Too long maternity leave may make women face greater discrimination and exclusion in the workplace, raise the employment threshold and reduce the chances of career promotion. In Germany, for example, the total length of maternity leave is 42.6 weeks, but the fertility rate in 2016 is only 1.50, while in the UK, the total holiday length is 12 weeks, but the total fertility rate is 1.81. Therefore, the protection of women's leave must be promoted synchronously with the measures to standardize the labor market, strengthen the protection of women's labor rights and interests, and improve the paternity system. If France has 11 days of paternity leave for men, parents in Sweden, France and Germany can share parental leave. Improving the father's maternity leave system not only encourages couples to share family affairs and childcare responsibilities, but also reduces the impact of men and women on fertility issues to a certain extent.

Second, economic subsidies are granted. In 2013, the average ratio of family welfare expenditure to GDP in OECD countries was about 2.4%, and there was a certain correlation between the proportion of family welfare expenditure and fertility level.In 2013, the proportion of family welfare expenditure in GDP in OECD32 countries except Turkey was in the range of 1%, with an average of 2.4%, of which the UK had the highest proportion of 4.0%, while Turkey had the lowest proportion of 0.4%. The higher the proportion of family welfare expenditure, the higher the fertility level. For example, Iceland accounts for 3.63% of family welfare expenditure, with a total fertility rate of 1.93% in 2014, while South Korea accounts for 1.32% of family welfare expenditure and a total fertility rate of 1.21%. During the new personal income tax reform in 2018, China included the education expenses for children aged 3 and above into the scope of pre-tax deduction, with a fixed amount of 1000 yuan per child per month.

Third, a large number of kindergartens have been built. In 2014, the average enrollment rate of OECD countries aged 0-2 years was 34.2%. The higher the enrollment rate, the higher the fertility level.Most OECD countries support childbirth through new government nurseries and encouraging the development of private kindergartens. In 2014, 85 per cent of OECD32 countries had enrollment rates of between 10 per cent and 60 per cent of those aged 0-2, with an average of 34.2 per cent. In addition, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Australia and other countries have also introduced policies to encourage grandparents to take care of their children from generation to generation, so as to reduce the pressure on parents. According to Tencent Education's "White Paper on 0-3-year-old Child Care Service Industry", the enrollment rate of 0-3-year-old infants in various child care institutions is only 4.1%, and intergenerational care is very common.

Fourth, strengthen the protection of women's employment rights, the smaller the employment gap between men and women, the higher the fertility rate.OECD countries attach importance to the protection of women's employment rights, such as public services led by the Swedish government provide a large number of jobs for women, Germany, South Korea, Japan, Singapore all provide re-employment training for postpartum women. According to the World Bank, the female labor force participation rate (aged 15 and over) of OECD members increased from 47.8% to 51.3% in 1990-2017, and the gap between male and female labor force participation rate decreased from 26.1% to 17.2%. Generally speaking, countries with a smaller employment gap between men and women mean that women's employment rights are better guaranteed and the fertility rate is higher. For example, in 2014, the employment gap between men and women in Sweden was only 3.4 percentage points, with a total fertility rate of 1.88, while in Italy, the employment gap between men and women was 18.2 percentage points, and the total fertility rate was only 1.37. The median income gap between men and women in OECD countries fell from 15.6 per cent to 13.5 per cent in 2006-2016. From 1990 to 2017, China's female labor force participation rate dropped from 73.2% to 61.5%, and the gap in the labor force participation rate widened from 11.6% to 14.6%.

3.2 France: actively promoting a balance between family and work, with a total fertility rate close to 2

France began to encourage childbirth long before World War II, achieving a work-family balance through a meticulous subsidy system, diversified child care services and creating a family-friendly corporate atmosphere, with a total fertility rate of 1.96 in 2016.At the beginning of the 18th century, France was the most populous country in Europe, but as the birth rate continued to decline, the population of France increased slightly from 38.48 million to 39.23 million in 1901-1911 to the fifth in Europe. As early as 1920, France introduced the Anti-abortion Law to curb the decline in the birth rate. In 1939, France promulgated the Family Code, which is the source of French family policy. Since then, France has continuously introduced and improved the policy of encouraging fertility and achieved results. According to the World Bank, the total fertility rate in France was 2.85 in 1960, fell to 2.09 in 1975, below the replacement level, and further dropped to 1.73 in 1994, an all-time low, but rebounded to 1.96 in 2016.

France has mainly taken the following measures: 1) guarantee holidays, including 16 weeks of maternity leave, 11 days of paternity leave for men and 1 year of parental leave for couples.According to the French government website, France currently has 16 weeks of maternity leave, including six weeks of prenatal leave and 10 weeks of postnatal leave. The employer does not provide wages during maternity leave, but the French Social Insurance Agency (CPAM) provides an allowance of 9-86 euros per day. The exact amount depends on the salary of the holiday taker. France has 11 days of paternity leave for men, during which it receives the same daily allowance as maternity leave. France has also set up an one-year parental leave, which can be shared by couples. You only need to apply to the employer one month in advance for the extension of leave, and the employer can't object. The employer does not pay wages during parental leave and the French Family Allowance Agency (CAF) provides an allowance of 396 euros per month.

2) provide financial subsidies, covering birth, parenting, childcare, loss of parents' income, and so on. French family welfare expenditure accounted for 3.7% of GDP in 2013, ranking third among OECD countries.At present, France has established a relatively perfect and diversified subsidy system, covering the birth, parenting, childcare, subsidies for parents' loss of income and other links, and the amount of subsidies varies significantly according to family income and the number of children. According to OECD, French household welfare spending accounted for 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2013, ranking third among OECD countries, after the UK and Denmark, and higher than the OCED average of 2.4 per cent.

3In France, the enrollment rate of 0-2 years old reached 51.9% in 2014, which is much higher than the OECD level.. France has a complete system of child care services, including collective reception institutions such as collective nurseries, family reception institutions such as kindergarten assistants, family caregivers such as nannies, and "entertainment receptionists". Either way, the French Family Allowance Fund (CAF) provides assistance, with employers paying at least 15 per cent for a babysitter to take care of their children at home. According to OECD data, France's enrollment rate between the ages of 0 and 2 was 51.9% in 2014, ranking eighth among all OECD countries and higher than the OECD average of 34.4%.

4Large enterprises work together to create a family-friendly corporate atmosphere, and the gap between male and female labor force participation in France is less than 10%.In 2012, about 400 large French companies signed the articles of Association of parents and employees, covering about 3 million employees, accounting for about 10% of the workforce, setting flexible working hours and minimum working hours for employees, and opposing workaholic corporate culture. refuse to work long hours and overtime; promote the promotion of female employees; promote fathers to use full-paid paternity leave. According to the World Bank, in 2017, the female labor force participation rate in France was 50.6%, and the gap between male and female labor force participation rate was only 9.6 percentage points, less than the average of 17.22 percentage points in OECD. According to OECD, the median income gap between men and women in France was only 9.9 per cent in 2016, less than 13.5 per cent of the OECD average.

5Immigrants account for about 9 per cent, of which 45 per cent are from Africa, which has also played a role in raising the fertility rate in France.According to the French Bureau of Statistics, France had 6.2 million immigrants in 2015, accounting for 9.3 per cent of the total population in 2015, up from 5 per cent and 7.4 per cent in 1946 and 1975. 44.6% of the immigrants came from Africa and 35.4% from Europe. The high fertility rate of immigrants from North Africa plays an important role in the rebound of fertility in France. Moreover, French immigrants have grown from male-dominated to female-oriented, with the proportion of female immigrants rising from 44 per cent to 51 per cent between 1968 and 2015.

3.3 Japan: the traditional gender division of labor intensifies the contradiction between work and family, the total fertility rate stays around 1.4, and the population situation is grim.

Japan has encouraged fertility since the 1990s, but the total fertility rate remained at 1.4 in 2016. The low fertility rate caused Japan's population to peak in 2008, 53% lower than its peak in 2100, and the aging rate is the highest in the world.Japan's total fertility rate was about 3 in 1950, continued to fall to 2.05 in 1974, reached an all-time low of 1.26 in 2005, and only rebounded to 1.44 in 2016, which has not yet returned to the ideal level. Against a long background of low fertility, Japan's population peaked at 128 million in 2008. According to the forecast in Japan's Statistical Yearbook, Japan's population will fall to 102 million by 2050, about 20 per cent below its peak, and less than 60 million by 2100, 53 per cent below its peak. In addition, Japan is the country with the most serious degree of aging in the world, with the proportion of people aged 65 and over rising rapidly from 4.9% to 27.7% in 1950-2017, of which the proportion of people aged 80 and above increased from 0.4% to 7.0%. It is estimated that the proportion of Japanese aged 65 and over will reach 37.7% and 38.3% respectively in 2050 and 2100.

1After World War II, Japan's family policy experienced three stages: controlling the population, stabilizing the population and encouraging childbearing. The period from 1948 to 1970 was the stage of controlling population growth.From 1947 to 1949, Japan experienced its first baby boom. a total of 8.02 million people were born in three years, and the birth rate rose sharply from 26.4 per thousand in 1945 to 32.9 per thousand in 1949. Japan began to study how to restrain population growth. In 1948, the Japanese government issued the eugenics Protection Act, which implemented fewer children and relaxed the restrictions on induced abortion. In 1949, the Japanese House of Representatives decided to improve and popularize the "family plan" and distribute contraceptives and contraceptives free of charge.The period from 1971 to 1989 is the stage of stabilizing the population size.From 1971 to 1973, the second baby boom appeared in Japan. In 1974, Japan's total fertility rate fell below the replacement level for the first time, and in 1974, the Ministry of Health and Labor of Japan took the static population as the new strategic goal of population development.

1990Since 1990, the total fertility rate has dropped to 1.57, which made Japanese society realize the current situation of low fertility rate and began to encourage childbearing, including vacations, economic subsidies, child care and so on. In terms of leave, Japan has 14 weeks of maternity leave, October parental leave, and 8 weeks of male parental leave.According to Japan's Ministry of Health and Labor, at present, Japanese women can enjoy maternity leave of six weeks before and eight weeks after birth; during maternity leave, they can receive the same maternity allowance as before leave; Japanese women can take 10 months of parental leave before the child is 1 year old; the allowance actually received during parental leave can reach up to 80% of the pre-leave salary. In addition, Japanese men also have eight weeks' parental leave, and if they take parental leave during female maternity leave, they can apply for another eight-week parental leave before the child is 1 year old and 2 months old.

In terms of economic subsidies, Japanese women who give birth can receive an one-time temporary payment of 420000 yen and a child subsidy of about 10, 000 yen a month (under the age of 12).Japanese women who give birth can receive an one-time temporary childbearing payment of 420000 yen, and children can get a subsidy for raising children. Within the income limit, families raising a child under the age of three can receive a child subsidy of 15000 yen a month; families raising children from the age of 3 to graduating from primary school can receive 10000 yen a month for children with less than two children, and 15000 yen for three or more children.

In the area of child care, Japan has expanded its child care services through three "Angel programs" and has developed a "Zero Battle for standby Children" plan.. Japan implemented the Angel Project in 1994, the New Angel Project in 1999 and the third phase of the Angel Project in 2004, focusing on expanding child care services. The Japanese government formulated the "standby children zero combat" plan in 2001 and the "new standby children zero combat" plan in 2008, with the intention of reducing the number of "standby children" who need to enter the nursery but have to wait in line at home due to lack of facilities and manpower to zero.

In terms of improving the employment environment, Japan creates a better business environment for parenting families.Japan formulated the basic Policy of fewer Children in 1999, the basic Law on Social Countermeasures in 2003, and the outline of Social Countermeasures in 2004. improve the employment environment and social health care, education environment, living environment to promote fertility. If employees have children under 3 years old, they can apply to the company to shorten their daily working hours to 6 hours; employees with preschool children can not work overtime for more than 24 hours a month, etc.

2Japan's fertility policy has not achieved remarkable results, for one thing, it missed the best opportunity to adjust the fertility policy and failed to adjust it earlier.Japan missed the best time to adjust its fertility policy. The total fertility rate fell below the replacement level in 1974, but did not encourage fertility until 1990, while the French total fertility rate fell below the replacement level in 1975. But fertility was encouraged as early as 1939.

Second, Japan is weak in encouraging childbirth, accounting for only 1.5% of family welfare expenditure, ranking last among OECD countries.According to the National Institute of Social Security and population Studies, household spending as a share of GDP in Japan rose from 0.47 per cent to 1.34 per cent in 1980-2014. According to OECD data, Japanese household welfare expenditure accounted for only 1.49% of GDP in 2013, which is lower than the average of 2.43% of OECD and ranks last among OECD countries. In terms of child care, according to OECD data, the enrollment rate of 0-2 years old in Japan in 2013 was only 30.6%, lower than the OECD28 national average of 34.4%, and much lower than France's 51.9% and Sweden's 46.9%.

Third, the gender division of labor between men and women in Japan is relatively common, and more and more Japanese women give up marriage and childbearing in the workplace. From 1990 to 2015, the lifetime fianc é rate of women over the age of 50 surged from 4.3% to 14.6%.Unlike Finland, Sweden and other countries that socialize part of the work of raising children and providing for the aged and are borne by the state, the responsibility for raising children and providing for the aged in Japan is mostly borne by family women. the idea of defining the role of women as full-time housewives still exists, and the idea of "men dominate the outside and women in the house" is more common. According to the World Bank, Japan's female labor force participation rate reached 50.5% in 2017, lower than the OECD average of 51.3%. In 2017, the gap in Japan's male and female labor force participation rate reached 20.1 percentage points, higher than the OECD average of 17.2 percentage points. According to OECD, the employment gap between men and women in Japan in 2014 was 17.9 percentage points, higher than the average of 11.8 percentage points in OECD; in 2016, the median income gap between men and women among full-time workers in Japan was 24.6 per cent, higher than the average of 13.5 per cent in OECD countries. More and more Japanese women are choosing (temporarily) to abandon their families and enter the workplace. According to the National Institute of Social Security and population Studies of Japan, the lifetime fiance rates in 1990, 2010 and 2015 were 5.6%, 20.4% and 23.4% for men and 4.3%, 10.6% and 14.6% for women, respectively. Japanese society has formed a concept of unwillingness to marry and have children, and long-term accumulation is not easy to solve.

4 Policy recommendations: immediately and fully liberalize and encourage childbirth

4.1 abandon the concept that population is a burden, be more people-oriented, and speed up the promotion of long-term and balanced population development

Both Malthus's "population Theory" of 1798 and the "limits of growth" of the Club of Rome in the 1970s underestimated the effect of technological progress and the change of production relations on the development of productive forces, and overestimated the trend of population growth, thus drawing the conclusion that population growth must be restrained in order to achieve development. In the long run, technological progress and changes in production relations will bring about a huge increase in productivity, enough to achieve the coordination of population and development. For China, without a strict family planning policy, the fertility rate will gradually decline and population growth will slow, but the demographic dividend will be delayed and will not face such complex and serious demographic structural problems.

Population is an important support and symbol of a country's national strength.From the perspective of Chinese history, population growth is often an important symbol of prosperity, such as the Kaiyuan era and the Kangqian era. From an international point of view, India is considered by many people to have great potential for development, nothing more than its huge population size and very young population structure. In 2015, the median age of India was only 26.7 years, compared with 37.0 years in China and 37.6 years in the United States. By 2050, the median age of China's population will reach 50, compared with 42.3 in the United States and 37.5 in India. Can China rely on such a demographic structure to achieve national rejuvenation? Of course, the quality of the population is also very important, and with the improvement of education, the population quality dividend will partially offset the disappearance of the population dividend.

People are the basic elements and driving force of development, and all economic and social development is for people.The current rapid development of artificial intelligence has triggered some people's discussion about whether China still needs to let go of childbearing. There are three aspects that need to be paid attention to: first, the problems of population development, such as aging, "leftover men" and families without singles, cannot be solved or difficult to be solved by artificial intelligence. Second, there are many jobs that require emotional communication in the economy and society, which I am afraid cannot be replaced by artificial intelligence. Third, even if artificial intelligence can completely replace human labor, then people can also do other things that are more conducive to achieving all-round development and happiness. According to the 2018 PricewaterhouseCoopers report, "the net impact of artificial intelligence and related technologies on employment in China", artificial intelligence and related technologies will replace about 26 per cent of existing jobs in China over the next 20 years. but it can also create a large number of new jobs by increasing productivity and real income, with a net impact on Chinese employment of about 12 per cent. From the history of human development, every scientific and technological progress will save the use of labor in traditional industries, but it also gives birth to the demand for labor in new economy and new industries.

4.2 Fertility should be liberalized immediately and fully, so that reproductive rights can be returned to the family.

Fully liberalize childbearing, and return the right to whether or not to have a few children and when to give birth to the family, and each family independently decides the number of children to bear."immediately" is due to the urgent demographic situation, which is currently in the fertility window for people born in the middle and later stages of the third baby boom.The peak of the third baby boom was in 1987, and the people born in the middle and late stages were still at the main childbearing age before the age of 35, especially those born after 1990 were still at the best childbearing age of 25-29 years old. Once you miss the third baby boom, you will get half the result with twice the effort if you want to increase the number of births in the future. Moreover, full liberalization should be made sooner rather than later, and it must be done as soon as possible.

With the full liberalization of childbearing, people who did not want to have children will still not have children, but some people who want to have three children will not have to worry that a large number of people and some areas will have a large increase in the number of births.This fear is just as some people predicted that the number of births would soar after the implementation of the "comprehensive two-child" policy, but this is not the case. According to the statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics, the total fertility rates in rural China in 2010 and 2015 were 1.44,1.27 respectively, of which the total fertility rates of one child, two children, three children and above in 2015 were 0.61,0.53,0.13 respectively. This means that rural residents do not have a strong desire to have children, and none of them are willing to have a second child, let alone a third child.

4.3 accelerate the construction of a fertility support system and vigorously encourage fertility

From a micro point of view, fertility is a family affair, and from a macro point of view, it is also a national affair. As the effect of the "comprehensive two-child" policy is not good, it is expected that the full liberalization will not significantly change the fertility situation. It is necessary to speed up the construction of a fertility support system, vigorously create a fertility-friendly social environment, and relieve families' worries about giving birth (again). Let more people want to have children, dare to have children and raise their children well.

One is to implement a differentiated personal income tax deduction and economic subsidy policy, covering health care from pregnancy to the age of 18 or the end of academic education.Explore the establishment of a comprehensive system to encourage childbirth from pregnancy care to childbirth during pregnancy to the age of 18 or the end of academic education, including pregnancy health care allowance, hospital delivery allowance, childcare allowance, education allowance, family personal tax deduction, and direct financial subsidies for low-income people who do not meet the criteria for individual income tax. Moreover, according to the actual situation, various localities can further differentiate on the basis of national policies.

The second is to increase the supply of child care services, vigorously increase the enrollment rate of 0-3 years old from the current 4% to 40%, and subsidize intergenerational care.We will vigorously encourage and support employers and social forces to set up infant care service institutions to form a network of full-day care, half-day care, time care and temporary care. At the same time, subsidies are provided to grandparents who take care of each other, so as to increase the enthusiasm of grandparents to take care of each other and reduce the pressure on parents' care.

The third is to further improve the protection of women's employment rights and interests, and implement fertility tax incentives for enterprises, and speed up the construction of a reasonable and effective mechanism for sharing fertility costs among the state, enterprises and families.On the one hand, we should further promote the implementation of maternity leave, breast-feeding leave and other systems, properly solve the extension of maternity leave and male paternity leave, and impose economic or administrative penalties on units that damage women's employment rights and interests. On the other hand, according to the size of female employees and the annual fertility situation, a certain degree of tax incentives should be implemented to reduce the childbearing costs borne by enterprises. The pilot project of the merger of maternity insurance and workers' medical insurance will begin in 2017 and is expected to be implemented nationwide, which will help expand the coverage and convenience of maternity insurance.

Fourth, we should strengthen the protection of equal rights to give birth out of wedlock.Although giving birth out of wedlock is not encouraged, women who give birth out of wedlock and their children still need to be given all equal rights, especially in terms of settlement, enrollment, and so on, without discrimination.

Fifth, increase investment in education and health care, maintain long-term stability of housing prices, and reduce the direct cost of raising.Increase investment in pre-university education, vigorously increase the supply of public kindergartens, extend nine-year compulsory education to 12 years, and promote educational reform to effectively eradicate the phenomenon that "homework becomes homework for parents". We will increase investment in medical care, promote the reform of the medical and health system, and effectively reduce medical expenses. Adhere to the orientation of "housing without speculation", build a long-term mechanism for the healthy development of the real estate market, and improve the housing market system and housing security system, so that all people can live.