来源：巴伦周刊
作者： 拉里·哈瑟维(Larry Hatheway)
编者按
国际评级机构惠誉周三（5月24日）将美国AAA主权信用评级列入负面观察名单，惠誉在新闻稿中写道：“党派争斗正在阻碍提高或暂停债务上限协议的达成。”惠誉指出，“仍预计债务上限问题能在‘X日’之前得到解决”，但美国“无法偿付部分债务”的风险正在上升。
不过，惠誉重申美国整体信贷强劲，这对一些投资者来说或许是一个可以保持乐观的迹象，该机构预计，即使在债务违约的情况下，美国的国家信用上限(Country Ceiling)仍将维持在AAA。
Jackson Hole Economics联合创始人、瑞银前首席经济学家拉里·哈瑟维(Larry Hatheway)近日在为《巴伦周刊》撰写的文章中从博弈论的角度对美国两党的博弈筹码和博弈的代价做了分析。
在电影《不要抬头》(Don't Look Up)中，由詹妮弗·劳伦斯(Jennifer Lawrence)和莱昂纳多·迪卡普里奥(Leonardo DiCaprio)饰演的科学家试图在一颗巨大的彗星与地球相撞、摧毁地球上所有生命之前警告美国政府采取行动，不幸的是，“政治失能”(political dysfunction)导致了一系列失误、威胁、延误和混乱的议程，最后地球被摧毁了，因为政治家、媒体和市场似乎都不认为一切真的会变得如此糟糕。
美国债务上限是目前最令金融市场感到紧张的问题之一。上周五，就在提高债务上限的协议似乎即将达成之际，众议院共和党人宣布“暂停”讨论。
接下来会发生什么取决于行动者的动机，值得指出的是，这一次谈判桌上不止有两方，接下来会发生什么还取决于双方在僵局无法打破、美国有可能违约的情况下的后备计划是什么。
在下文中，我们来讨论一下债务上限谈判的博弈论方面，虽然可能无法回答投资者和普通民众都在问的最主要问题——美国是否会违约？但或许可以揭示关键参与者的动机，以及这些动机如何影响最终结果，包括对市场的影响。
首先，目前这种情况不属于最经典的囚徒困境，这是一件好事。囚徒困境是指囚徒们倾向于合作，但不合作的动机会造成“双输”。
有三种可能的结果。首先，双方通过合作和谈判最终达成解决方案；第二，一方怀着诚意参加谈判，另一方却不是这样；第三，双方都没有怀着诚意参加谈判，在这种情况下，债务上限谈判就不会类似于囚徒困境，因为不合作带来的负面回报（损失）对双方来说都可能是如此之大，以至于合作成为最可能的结果。
仅凭这一点，就可以解释为什么尽管违约的最后期限越来越近（美国财政部长耶伦说最后期限为6月1日），金融市场迄今为止仍保持坚挺。无法达成协议所隐含的损失被认为在政治、金融和经济上都是灾难性的，因此市场的集体智慧是，在违约发生之前，协议将会达成。
博弈的代价是什么？在政治方面，继20世纪90年代和2010年代初的边缘政策策略之后，众议院共和党人【先是在议长纽特·金里奇(Newt Gingrich)的领导下，后来又在议长约翰·博纳(John Boehner)的领导下】在民意调查中遭遇挫折，因为选民大多将破坏性的政府停摆和市场波动归咎于他们。共和党目前以微弱优势在众议院占据多数席位，议长麦卡锡在思考自己的政治未来时，一定在紧张地审视这段历史。同样，代表拜登总统在2020年赢得的选区的16名众议院共和党人也必须如此，如果债务上限的惨败导致选民指责共和党，这些选区的选民可能很容易转向民主党。
经济和财政方面的代价很难确定。美国国债的信用风险溢价极有可能上升，而且可能只会缓慢下降，从而增加纳税人承担的偿债成本；金融市场可能遭受毁灭性的挫折，增加整体经济的不确定性，很可能引发经济衰退。
由于所有这些原因——违约带来的政治、金融和经济方面的代价——麦卡锡最终可能不会在与拜登政府的谈判中代表共和党内的统一战线，众议院的强硬派共和党人与代表边缘席位的温和派共和党人相比，妥协的可能性要小得多。
那么，众议院共和党人是否有可能分裂，让所有众议院民主党人和少数温和派共和党人组成多数，通过一项提高债务上限的法案？在我撰写本文时，共和党阵营似乎还没有出现这样的裂痕，但值得注意的是，在2013年，倒戈的风险是最后终结债务上限危机的妥协性立法的重要推动力。
谈判的性质还取决于各方的后备计划。如果麦卡锡认为他在政治上的最佳机会取决于从拜登政府那里获得削减开支的重大让步，那么他完全有动力用他在上周所使用的那种充满希望的语言来吸引他们。但如果麦卡锡终止谈判，他的后备计划是什么？在不愿被虚无主义打败的情况下（“为了拯救美国，我们不得不让美国破产”），如果他所代表的一方不愿妥协，他真有可靠的后备计划吗？
麦卡锡的后备计划可能是允许对提高债务上限进行“自由投票”，这样做相当于允许温和派共和党人改变立场，确保法案的通过。这对麦卡锡来说可能不是一个好结果，可能导致他与共和党强硬派直接对抗，但这似乎是他剩下的为数不多的选择之一。
另一方面，拜登政府拥有更有吸引力的后备计划，虽然可能不完美，也不是首选，但无论如何，拜登手里的牌似乎比麦卡锡更多。
首先，财政部可以诉诸美国宪法第14修正案（其中写道：“法律授权的公共债务的有效性……不得受到质疑”），通过借款来偿还债务，将宪法是否站在自己一边的问题留给旷日持久的法庭争斗。这一策略至少可以争取一些时间。
另一个策略是财政部发行溢价债券（以高于票面价值的价格发售的债券），这部分债券不算在债务上限里。
最后，根据宪法，财政部可以铸造任何面值的铂金硬币，并将其出售给美联储，从而筹集足够的资金来偿还债务。
虽然财政部长耶伦曾说，这些举措不在考虑之列，但当面临违约、市场混乱、经济受到沉重打击以及选民抵制时，人们不禁会想：政府会不会为了权宜之计牺牲自己的原则？
在严肃的博弈中，竞争者需要有坚如磐石的立场，不能有明显的裂痕。健全的战略还需要一个备用计划——当其他一切都失败时该怎么做。拥有一些灵活的选择也非常有帮助——无论它们有多令人讨厌——可以用来避免更糟糕的结果。
在债务上限谈判这场严肃的博弈中，拜登政府似乎占了上风。这也许不是一件好事，因为这可能会让政府变得固执，进而导致政府不愿看到的结果——违约。
不过，众议院共和党人和议长面临的形势也很严峻。有人会认为，向虚无主义投降一直都是一种选择，但这只有在政党保持团结的情况下才会发生，而目前共和党内部并不团结。
最后，在面对这些风险时，投资者是否表现得过于自满了？也许是的，在美国政府彻底违约之前，其他糟糕的结果（比如美国主权评级再次被下调等）可能导致市场遭受重创。
不过，如果市场的集体赌注是基于政府违约的可能性，那么为相对平静的市场定价提供担保的，似乎是谈判双方的相对优势和弱势。
希望最后我们都能“抬起头来”。
编辑/jayden
Source: Barron's
Author: Larry Hatheway (Larry Hatheway)
Editor's note
International rating agency Fitch added US AAA sovereign credit ratings to a negative watch list on Wednesday (5/24)Fitch wrote in a press release: “Partisan battles are blocking the conclusion of an agreement to raise or suspend the debt ceiling.” Fitch pointed out that “it is still expected that the debt ceiling issue will be resolved before 'X day',” but the risk that the US “will not be able to repay part of its debt” is rising.
However, Fitch reiterated that overall US credit is strong, which may be a sign of optimism for some investors. The agency expects the US Country Ceiling (Country Ceiling) to remain at AAA even in the event of a debt default.
Larry Hatheway (Larry Hatheway), co-founder of Jackson Hole Economics and former chief economist of UBS, recently analyzed the game chips and costs of the two parties in the US from the perspective of game theory in an article written for “Barron's.”
In the movie “Don't Look Up” (Don't Look Up), scientists, played by Jennifer Lawrence (Jennifer Lawrence) and Leonardo DiCaprio (Leonardo DiCaprio), tried to warn the US government to act before a giant comet collided with the Earth and destroyed all life on Earth. Unfortunately, “political dysfunction” (political dysfunction) led to a series of mistakes, threats, delays, and a chaotic agenda. In the end, the Earth was destroyed , because politicians, the media, and the market don't seem to think everything will actually get this bad.
The US debt ceiling is currently one of the most stressful issues in financial markets.House Republicans announced a “moratorium” on discussions last Friday, just as an agreement to raise the debt ceiling seemed close to being reached.
What will happen next depends on the motives of the actors. It is worth pointing out that there are more than two parties at the negotiation table this time; what will happen next also depends on what the two sides have backup plans in the event that the impasse cannot be broken and the US is likely to default.
In the following, we'll discuss the game theory aspect of debt ceiling negotiations, although it may not answer the main question that investors and ordinary people ask — will the US default? But it may be possible to reveal the motivations of key players and how those motivations influence the final outcome, including the impact on the market.
First, the current situation is not part of the classic prisoner plight, which is a good thing. The prisoner's plight means that prisoners tend to cooperate, but the motive for not cooperating can result in a “double loss.”
There are three possible outcomes.First, the two sides finally reached a solution through cooperation and negotiation; second, one party participated in the negotiations in good faith, but the other did not participate in the negotiations in good faith. Under such circumstances, debt ceiling negotiations would not be similar to a prisoner's plight, because the negative rewards (losses) of non-cooperation could be so great for both parties that cooperation became the most likely outcome.
This alone explains why financial markets have remained strong so far, even though the default deadline is getting closer (US Treasury Secretary Yellen said the deadline is June 1). The losses implied by not being able to reach an agreement are seen as being politically, financially, and economically disastrous, so the collective wisdom of the market is that an agreement will be reached before a default occurs.
What is the cost of the game? On the political front, following the marginal policy strategies of the 1990s and early 2010s, House Republicans [first under Speaker Newt Gingrich (Newt Gingrich) and later under Speaker John Boehner (John Boehner)] experienced setbacks in public opinion polls because voters mostly blamed them for disruptive government shutdowns and market fluctuations. The Republican Party currently holds the majority of seats in the House of Representatives by a narrow margin. Speaker McCarthy must be nervously examining this period of history when thinking about his political future. Similarly, the 16 House Republicans representing the districts President Biden won in 2020 must do the same. If the debt-ceiling debacle causes voters to blame the Republicans, voters in those districts may easily switch to the Democratic Party.
The economic and financial costs are difficult to determine. The credit risk premium on US Treasury bonds is likely to rise, and it is likely that it will only slowly decline, thereby increasing the cost of debt repayment borne by taxpayers; financial markets may suffer a devastating setback, increasing uncertainty about the overall economy, and is likely to trigger a recession.
For all of these reasons -- the political, financial, and economic costs of default --McCarthy may not ultimately represent a united front within the Republican Party in negotiations with the Biden administration. The hardline Republicans in the House of Representatives are far less likely to compromise than the moderate Republicans representing marginal seats.
So is it possible for House Republicans to split and let all House Democrats and a few moderate Republicans form a majority and pass a bill to raise the debt ceiling? There doesn't seem to be such a rift in the Republican camp at the time of writing, but it's worth noting that in 2013, the risk of defection was an important driver for compromise legislation that finally ended the debt ceiling crisis.
The nature of the negotiations also depends on the parties' backup plans. If McCarthy thinks his best chance in politics hinges on getting major concessions to cut spending from the Biden administration, then he's fully motivated to woo them with the kind of hopeful language he used last week. But if McCarthy ends negotiations, what are his backup plans? In a situation where he doesn't want to be defeated by nihilism (“To save America, we have to bankrupt America”), does he really have a reliable backup plan if the party he represents isn't willing to compromise?
McCarthy's backup plan may allow for a “free vote” to raise the debt ceiling. Doing so would be tantamount to allowing moderate Republicans to change their positions and ensure that the bill passes.This may not be a good outcome for McCarthy, and could lead him to directly confront the Republican hardliners, but it appears to be one of the few choices he has left.
On the other hand, the Biden administration has a more attractive backup plan. Although it may not be perfect or the first choice, no matter what, Biden seems to have more cards in his hands than McCarthy.
First, the Treasury could appeal to the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution (which states: “The validity of public debt authorized by law... cannot be questioned”) to repay the debt through loans, leaving the question of whether the Constitution is on its side to a protracted court battle. This strategy could at least buy some time.
Another strategy is for the Ministry of Finance to issue premium bonds (bonds sold at a price higher than the face value). These bonds are not included in the debt ceiling.
Finally, according to the Constitution, the Treasury can mint platinum coins of any face value and sell them to the Federal Reserve to raise enough money to pay off debts.
Although Treasury Secretary Yellen has said that these measures are not being considered, when faced with default, market chaos, a heavy blow to the economy, and voter boycotts, people can't help but wonder: Will the government sacrifice its principles for expediency?
In a serious game, contenders need to have a rock-solid position, and there must be no obvious rift.A sound strategy also requires a backup plan — what to do when all else fails. Having some flexible options is also really helpful — no matter how annoying they are — that can be used to avoid worse results.
In the serious game of debt ceiling negotiations, the Biden administration seemed to have the upper hand. This is probably not a good thing, because it may make the government stubborn, which in turn will lead to an outcome the government doesn't want to see — default.
However, the situation facing House Republicans and Speaker is also very serious. Some people think that surrendering to nihilism has always been an option, but this will only happen if the political parties remain united, and there is currently no unity within the Republican Party.
Finally, are investors being overly complacent in the face of these risks? Perhaps, before the US government completely defaults, other poor outcomes (such as the US sovereign rating being downgraded again) could hit the market hard.
However, if the market's collective bet is based on the possibility that the government will default, then the guarantee for relatively calm market pricing seems to be the comparative advantage and weakness of the negotiating parties.
I hope we can all “raise our heads” in the end.
Editor/jayden
