At the end of the year and the beginning of the year, people are busy reviewing the past and looking forward to the coming year, and economists predict that the macro situation and growth rate next year will be conventional programs. However, under the special internal and external economic environment this year, all parties are more active in the forecast of economic growth in 2023, and the differences in specific forecasts are significantly larger than those in normal years.

For example, at the end of 2019, there was a heated discussion on whether the economic growth rate should be "guaranteed 6" in the coming year, advocating that the higher growth rate should reach 6%, while those who were less optimistic should take the growth rate of about 5% as the target, with a difference of about 1 percentage point. Looking at the growth forecasts of dozens of institutions since late November at the end of 2022, the gap between the higher growth forecast of around 5.5 per cent and the lower forecast of around 4.5 does not seem to be much different from that of 2019. However, some well-known scholars predict that the opinion is more divergent: some think that the growth rate will be higher than 6% next year, or suggest that the economic growth target should be more than 6.5%; some scholars propose to strive for 6% GDP growth next year, and even propose to achieve 8% growth next year; look at the low-minded researchers and media published articles suggesting that the need to prepare for the Great Recession in 2023.

How to treat the phenomenon that there is a big difference between the academic circles and the market on the growth forecast in 2023 recently?

The relationship of economic variables is governed by the law of causality: as one of the basic indicators of the economic situation, the future trend of GDP growth is restricted by a series of long-term and short-term economic and policy variables. Based on the assumption of the relevant main explanatory factors, the economic forecast puts forward the research and estimation of the future change direction and quantity level of GDP and other forecast variables. Although there are different opinions on the specific forecast results in a particular situation, there are generally several supporting conditions behind a kind of economic professional prediction in the common sense.

The first is the analytical framework and logic of the forecaster.Its function is to determine which explanatory variables are the most important for the forecast object, and it is of special significance to determine the degree of agreement between the prediction analysis and the economic law. In terms of short-term growth forecasts, economic common sense is helpful to suggest the main explanatory variables in the general sense, but it is especially necessary for forecasters to judge which factors are the most critical in a particular situation. In terms of economic growth forecast in 2023, forecasters will pay attention to the key factors such as epidemic strategy transformation, macro and regulatory policy adjustment, and external environment changes within their respective cognitive frameworks.

The second is the empirical conjecture of the evolution trajectory of the key variables in the prediction period.It is more difficult to get the empirical parameters right in economic forecasting, and it is especially important to provide a good forecasting point of view. The change in epidemic prevention and control policy is good for economic growth in 2023, but how big will be the impact during the transition period of policy change? What is the peak spread of the epidemic and its subsequent slowing trajectory and its impact? What are the details of the changes in macro and regulatory policies and the external environment next year? Judging such problems requires classification and in-depth follow-up research beyond the current situation, and sometimes requires penetrating research that crosses the usual professional boundaries, which largely determines the professional ability and level of specific forecasters.

The third is the information about the actual state or initial conditions of the predicted object.The evolution of macroeconomic variables is controlled by empirical laws, and understanding its recent or current state has cognitive and predictive meaning for its follow-up trend, and has important reference value in special cases. For example, China's economy grew by 2.3% in 2020, and the economy still recovered smoothly in the fourth quarter. This initial condition supports the prediction of a sharp rebound in growth in 2021. For example, China's economic growth reached a high of 14.2% in 2007, and faced with significant inflation and soaring asset prices, the forecast of growth in 2008 obviously needs to consider the pullback effect that may be derived from economic self-adjustment and countercyclical policy intervention.

Based on the understanding of the general law of economic forecasting, combined with the observation of the characteristics and causes of China's economic operation during the epidemic period, especially in 2022, it is not difficult to see that the economic growth situation will face new changes next year, and the economic growth rate will pick up significantly. However, the respective analysis framework of the forecasters determines the different understanding of the key variables restricting economic growth next year, coupled with the differences in the future evolution of specific variables, which leads to the divergence of economic growth forecasts in 2023. This can be observed and discussed from several aspects.

First, under the premise of generally affirming that withdrawal from the epidemic containment strategy is good for growth next year, forecasters have more differences in judging the duration and impact of the policy transition period.

The economic growth during the epidemic period is determined by the objective conditions of the impact of the epidemic situation, the prevention and control of the epidemic situation and the choice of economic policies in various countries. At the beginning of the pandemic, the international community generally implemented the containment strategy (containment strategy), using a variety of social distance control means to control the spread of the virus; later, with the mutation of the virus and the improvement of the treatment ability of patients, especially mass vaccination, most foreign countries turned to the mitigation strategy of coexistence with the virus (mitigation strategy). In the past three years, China has continuously adopted the containment strategy to adhere to the goal of clearing zero. as far as it affects the economic situation, it has achieved different results and faced different difficulties in different stages of the evolution of the epidemic.

Generally speaking, in 2020, China will mobilize the implementation of a strong containment strategy to quickly control the spread of the epidemic, coupled with the implementation of active macro policies to promote faster economic recovery. With the prevalence of Delta virus and other mutants in 2021, the implementation of containment strategy can still achieve the goal of zero clearance, but the pressure on economic operation began to increase significantly. With the prevalence of the more communicable Omicron mutant in 2022, the intensity of social mobilization and investment resources required to adhere to the containment strategy increased, and the data showed that it was actually difficult to achieve the national dynamic zero clearance goal. At the same time, frequent closure and control measures have become an unbearable drag on economic operation. although macro departments have implemented several rounds of measures to stabilize growth, they have still failed to reverse the increasing momentum of endogenous economic downward pressure under the impact of the epidemic, and the impact may be equivalent to a reduction of about 2 percentage points in GDP. Against this background, it is a pragmatic and reasonable move to withdraw from the "three unswerving" prevention and control strategies at the end of the year, and it has become one of the most important positive factors for betting on economic recovery in 2023.

However, forecasters have different understandings and judgments on how the impact of these policies will be released. International experience and recent domestic situation show that a certain number of serious cases and unfortunate deaths are inevitable after withdrawing from the containment strategy. The resumption of economic consumption will not be immediate, but will only occur after the lag, and the widespread spread of infection may significantly drag down domestic economic growth at the beginning of 2023. China's exit containment strategy is in the cold winter season, and the impact will be greater during the transition period in the dry and cold northern region, which is more suitable for virus survival and transmission. The three-year epidemic will have a psychological impact on consumers and damage the balance sheets of small and micro enterprises. Whether these can be repaired quickly will affect the economic recovery next year. Differences in evaluation opinions on these issues derive different views on predictions.

Second, macroeconomic policies are expected to continue to be positive in 2023, but there is uncertainty about the strength of additional positive policy measures in the coming year under the background of multi-round stimulus in 2022.

During the epidemic period, China's macroeconomic policy has experienced two positive and intermediate tightening saddle-shaped evolution. In early 2020, an extraordinarily proactive macro policy focusing on 1 trillion special treasury bonds and more than 500 billion monetary expansion was launched, which played an important role in ensuring and promoting the strong recovery of the economy after the stability of the epidemic. For more than a year from the second half of 2020 to the summer of 2021, the previously launched stimulus tools withdrew successively, superimposed the impact of regulatory storms in several departments, and once formed a marginal tightening policy environment. In the autumn of 2021, especially more than a year after the return of downward pressure on the economy at the end of the year, macro departments have launched several rounds of measures to stabilize growth, and macro policies such as monetary, fiscal and infrastructure policies continue to tend to be loose, and some partial easing is close to 2020.

Judging from the data of the first 11 months of 2022, the implementation of monetary and financial policies shows that the significant expansion of the monetary policy of the central bank, coupled with the abnormal growth of household savings, has pushed the growth rate of broad money to the level comparable to that at the beginning of the epidemic in 2020, resulting in the so-called liquidity siltation. Due to factors such as the decline in mortgage financing and the slowdown in the growth rate of local government debt, the growth rate of social finance has rebounded only slightly compared with mid-2021. From the perspective of fiscal policy, in early 2022, the agency estimated that the broad fiscal deficit ratio (public budget and government funds) of the two books this year will reach about 8%, close to the peak of 8.6% in 2020. The utilization rate of the broad fiscal deficit in the first 10 months of 2022 is much higher than that of the previous two years. It can be seen that the positive degree of broad fiscal expansion in 2022 is considerable.

In the face of the increasing triple downward pressure on the economy, the Central Economic work Conference at the end of 2022 expressed the need to "strengthen the regulation and control of macro policies", proposed that "positive fiscal policies should be strengthened to improve efficiency" and "prudent monetary policies should be accurate and effective". It shows that macro policy is expected to continue to maintain a positive orientation in 2023. However, considering that there is already a background for macroeconomic policy expansion in 2022, it may be difficult to increase stimulus measures in the coming year to promote economic recovery, while ensuring "effective prevention and resolution of major economic and financial risks". Is the central finance willing to issue additional treasury bonds on a large scale to expand available financial resources? Or whether it is prepared to temporarily reduce the tax rates of major indirect or direct taxes to release water for economic growth to raise fish; and whether the monetary authorities are willing to take more aggressive interest rate cuts in the context of the limited expansion of liquidity and base money? Different assessments of such issues affect the view on the 2023 growth forecast.

Third, the regulatory policies of key industries are expected to be further relaxed and good for economic growth. However, there are different views on the implementation strength and corrective effect of the above policies.

A special point in the evolution of China's policy environment during the epidemic period is that the relevant departments have launched a series of stringent regulatory measures from the second half of 2020 to the summer and autumn of 2021 in view of a number of industries, including real estate financial risks, anti-monopoly of Internet platforms, bad phenomena in the education and training industry, and excessive energy consumption. There are complex realistic roots behind the regulatory storm launched during the difficult period of the epidemic, and some positive results have also been achieved in strengthening supervision and governance. however, some of the target industries have their own macro effects, coupled with the superimposed effect of multi-sector governance. Objectively, it restricts economic growth. This impact is hidden around the first quarter of 2021 when the economy recovers smoothly, and is highlighted under downward pressure on the economy.

In view of the problems caused by sports regulation, the above regulatory policies have been adjusted in different ways since the second half of 2021, especially around the fourth quarter. Senior management resolutely rectified the practice of "sports carbon reduction" in the summer and autumn of 2021, the relevant policies continued after the K12 off-campus training industry was hit hard, and the regulation of real estate and Internet platforms continued to be actively fine-tuned. Regulatory policy adjustments continued in 2022, such as the central bank lowered LPR quotations three times to ease the burden of mortgage interest rates. In November, the central bank, the Bancassurance Regulatory Commission, and the Securities Regulatory Commission jointly issued the so-called "three arrows" to support the financing of real estate enterprises through credit, bond issuance and stock market channels, respectively. To some extent, the strong real estate policy regulated more than a year ago has become first aid. These adjustment measures have had some effect, but failed to reverse the significant contraction of the real estate industry and the relatively depressed state of the Internet platform industry.

At the end of the year, the Central Economic work Conference issued a policy signal for greater efforts to rectify deviations: it is required to "raise the level of normal supervision and support platform enterprises to show their skills in leading development, job creation, and international competition." "to ensure the steady development of the real estate market,... Meet the reasonable financing needs of the industry, promote industry restructuring and mergers and acquisitions, effectively prevent and defuse the risks of high-quality real estate enterprises, and improve the balance sheet. At present, it is obvious to all that the policy tends to be loose, and there is a greater consensus on its positive role. however, considering the structural reasons behind the sports regulatory storm, the new regulatory rules and their impact will still take effect, and whether the follow-up adjustment measures can be smooth sailing. How far the policy correction can go and how much positive effects it can bring, different judgments on these issues will also affect the results of next year's growth forecast.

Fourth, there are also differences in the judgment of the changes of the external economic environment and its impact on China, which has become one of the potential reasons for the differences in the forecast of economic growth in 2023.

With the international competitive advantage of China's manufacturing industry and the contrast between China's economic operation and that of the United States, the West and many countries in recent years, the total volume of China's foreign trade has reached two major levels of US $5 trillion and US $6 trillion during the epidemic period. faster export growth has pushed up the trade surplus, making the contribution rate of foreign demand to growth as high as 25% and 30%. As the US and Western economies did not see inflation for 40 years in 2021 and began to tighten monetary policy at the end of this year, it forced the economic growth rate to fall sharply for more than a year and gave rise to the risk of subsequent recession, accompanied by a significant decline in import demand for China. China's export dollar value showed negative growth in October this year and increased in November. Against the above background, most forecasters believe that external demand will contract in 2023 and restrict China's economic growth.

However, there is also room for discussion on the impact of external factors. The exact extent of the decline in the US, the West and the global economy in the coming year remains uncertain. For example, the recent increase in US economic growth in the third quarter and the slowdown in inflation in November suggest that there may be a "shallow recession" in its economic trend, and the impact on China's exports may slow down somewhat. In addition, in the face of adverse changes in the external environment, China's trade policy, local governments, and enterprises will all adjust their responses, such as renting special planes in some areas to help enterprises organize groups to foreign countries to rush orders after the epidemic policy has been loosened. Different judgments on the effectiveness of these efforts will have an impact on growth forecasts for next year. Other individual researchers believe that foreign trade will still make a more important contribution next year than this year. The above factors will also increase the differences in predictive opinions reported by the media.

The last part is how to treat the private economy facing the adverse changes in the public opinion environment, and to what extent the decision-makers will release the positive effect.

A little empirical fact is that the lack of momentum for China's economic growth is not entirely a new problem during the epidemic period. in fact, senior officials pointed out many times on different occasions in 2018 and 2019 that the economy was facing realistic downward pressure. There is no doubt that there are complex reasons for the lingering downward pressure on China's intermittent economy for a period of time, in addition to the external environment, especially the changes in Sino-US relations, the evolution of population growth and structure, and the decline of potential economic growth in the higher growth stage. the evolution of social thoughts has led to changes in the environment of public opinion in the private economy, and the development vitality of private enterprises, which is an important engine of growth in the era of reform in China, has been restrained. It is also a reason to pay attention to. For example, popular viewpoints such as "private enterprise exit theory", "new public-private partnership theory" and "private enterprise original sin theory" appeared around 2018, which have a significant impact on the private economy. In recent years, there has been an one-sided interpretation of the regulatory policies of some phased departments, frequently accusing enterprises of investment and operation as "capital disorderly expansion" and casually labeling entrepreneurs as capitalists and exploitation. The negative public opinion is intertwined with the actual predicament of the business environment during the epidemic period, which weakens the investment and entrepreneurial motivation of private enterprises and restricts economic growth.

Policy makers have always attached importance to this trend. On November 1, 2018, the supreme leader reiterated the principle of "two unwavering" at the forum of private enterprises, fully affirmed the important position and role of the "five six seven eight nine" of the private economy, and clearly pointed out that the "private economy departure theory" and the "new public-private partnership theory" are completely wrong. In view of the recent situation, at the end of 2022, the Central Economic work Conference took "earnestly implementing the 'two unwavering' as one of the tasks of economic work in 2023, and demanded that" in view of the incorrect comments in society on whether we should adhere to the 'two unshakable' or not. We must be clear and unequivocal. The "requirements" fall behind the requirements for equal treatment of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in terms of system and law, and encourage and support the development and growth of private economy and private enterprises in terms of policy and public opinion. "the new statement in this regard obviously has an important positive effect, but judging from the situation over the years, there are deep roots in this aspect, and it remains to be seen whether there will be a substantial improvement soon. Differences in the assessment of the effectiveness of policy guidance in this regard will also be one of the sources of divergence in growth forecasts in 2023.

In a word, there are more positive factors than unfavorable factors in China's economy in 2023. It is a high probability event to recover quickly after coming out of the epidemic, and the contribution to global economic growth is expected to increase significantly. At the same time, however, with many uncertainties, there is a reason for the divergence in growth forecasts. The author believes that epidemic prevention and control and active macro policies release growth momentum enough to hedge against adverse factors, making the economic growth rate recover to about 5% in 2023. If the corrective measures in the field of real estate and platform regulation are relatively effective, and the work of boosting the development confidence of private enterprises has achieved good results, the impact of an one-off change in the strategy of the epidemic is relatively limited, and the economic recovery is likely to accelerate to around 6%. To reach the potential growth level in recent years. However, in order to promote a new round of decent economic growth that has not been seen for many years, and quickly narrow the cumulative growth gap during the epidemic period, it is still necessary, as Mr. Wu Jinglian emphasized in his recent article, to "take the reform steps of marketization, rule of law, and democratization." there are important and systematic breakthroughs in structural reform and innovation.